The effects of option hedging on the costs of domestic price stabilization schemes by Larson, Donald F. & Coleman, Jonathan
Policy, Research,  and External  AffaIr  .
-WORKING-PAPERS, 
L  International  Trade
International  Economics  Department









Donald  F.  Larson
and
Jonathan  Coleman
Whether a stabilization fund is hedged or not, it will inevitably
generate large amounts of debt. But hedging the fund will make
it more likely to survive in the short term.
The  Policy, Research. and  Extemal Affairs Complex ditnobutes PRE Working Papers todissemnate  the fGdings  ofwok  in progess  and
to  rcoumge the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and  all othcrs interested  in development issues.  These  papers cmrry  the names of
















































































































dPolly, R0oeah, and  Exbrnol  Affairs
tenationl  Trodo
WPS 653
Thispaper-aproductofthe  International  Trade  Division,  International  Economics  Departmnent is  part
of a larger effort in PRE to improve  the developing  countries'  management  of commodity  price risks.
Copies  are  available  free  from  the-World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact
Dawn  Gustafson,  room S7-044,  ext6psion  33714  (23 pages, plus 19 pages of annexes).
Casual  observation  leads  to the conclusion  that  Positive  net benefits  stemming  from fund
commodity-stabilization  funds  tend  to be short-  hedging  can occur  even when  the welfare  gains
lived. While some funds  may have fi  ,d  to producers  and consumers  stemming  from  the
becuse of poor management  or unwarranted  stabilization  program  are small or nonexistent
political  interventions,  the stochasdc  components
of commodity  prices  can generate  insurmount-  To the extent that international  prices  follow
able difficulties  for even  the most expert  manag-  a log-normal  random  walk, the stochastic
cr8  By transferring  price risk from domestic  component  of price variability  can become
producers  and consumers  to government-backed  overwhelming  in relatively  large samples  of 500
stabiliation funds,  these  programs  generate  observations  increasing  the error associated  with
welfare  benefits  that end abruptly  when the  price  expectations  and hampering  the ability  of
fumds  faiL  fund  management  to determine  long-rn "rea-
sonable"  prices. While hedging  techniques  are
In the context  of a price-taking  country  perhaps  more  obviously  useful when  the  stochas-
sabilizing domestic  prices  through  variable  tic component  of price is large, similar  risk
border  tariffs,  Larson  and Coleman  annotate  the  benefits  occur  under simulations  in which  prices
cirumstances under which  fund resources  face  are  deterministic  and only international  supplies
large  or unlimited  liability  and provide  a simple  contain  a random  component.
strategy  of bpging with commodity  options  to
limit fund risk. Using  stochastic  computer  Hedging  techniques  will not render  the fnds
simulations,  the authors  demonstrate  that using  immortal;  they will  generate  revenue-based  risk
financial  options  will generate  positive  net  benefits  for governments  backing  the funds,  and
welfare  gains for the government  agencies  can  generate  benefits  to producers  and consum-
backing  the funds. These results  are quite robust  ers by extending  the probable  lives of the
under a nurnber  of underlying  assumptions.  stabilization  schemes.
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Commodity  pnces are notoriously  unstable  and many countries,  both industrial  and developing,  intervene
in commodity markets in order to limit the range of price movements.  Sometimes  the interventions  require
international  efforts in the form of commodity agreements' which attempt to use the market power of major
producers and sometimes consumers  to stabilize global prices; other programs are unilateral in nature and are
designed to defend prices within national borders. While the mechanisms  are varied, a common  charactedstic  of
almost all such programs  is their eventual  failure. Tbere are multiple  reasons  for the failure  of the various  schemes,
and some of the reasons are related  directly  to the form of the stabilization  program1 2; however,  a constant  stain on
any stabilization  program  is the stochastic  component  of commodity  prices which  renders  the financial,  or in the case
of buffer stocks, the physical  exhaustion  of resources  a statistical  eventuality.
In this paper a simple simulation  model is used to derive  several  results. First, different  samples of prices
generated  by a log-normal  random  walk can exhibit remarkably  different sample-distribution  charact  cs.  Ths
is not a new tesult -- see Wright and WilLiams  (1990)-  but serves to emphasize that, as a pratical  matter,
stabilization  fund managers must treat the future as unchartable  even when expectations  are rationat tbat Is, even
when market  agents are fiuly aware  of the deterninistic and stochastic  components  of price movements. Secondly,
the simulations  demonstrate  that price-band  stabilization  methods,  simil!r to those  currently  used in Clie  and Papua
New  Guinea  are fairly  neutral  in long-term  effects,  including  inefficiency  losses,  but that single-period  income  effects
can be quite large. In addition,  the over-all "risk"  benefits  coming from reduced  price variability  tend to be small.
Finally, by operating a stabilization  scheme, the govermnent  transfers the risk of large price movemenls  from
producers and consumers  to the government  and tax payers,  or more particularly,  to the financial  or physical  assets
of some stabilization  fund or buffer stocr. The simulations  show that simple hedging strategies  can greatly  reduce
the varability of fund revenues  and payments. By limiting the extreme payouts from the fund, such hedging can
extend the probable life of the stabilization  scheme. Hedging  does not, however,  offer immortlity.  These results
'McNicol (1978) documeuts  17 major commodity  agreements  since the close of World War I.
2S-e  Knudsen  and Nash (1990) for a description  of a wide range of stabilization  programs.
Iate quite robust across a wide range of assumptions. In addition,  the gains-to-bedging  results were shown to be
independent  of the assumption  that prices follow a random-walk.
In building  the simulation  model,  some very broad assumptions  needed  to be made about the basic way in
which  the modeled  market  was to operate  and these  basic assumptions  are maintained  throughout  the paper. Included
are the assumptions  that the country  is a price--taker,  that expectations  are rational, and that the country  attempts to
limit domestic  price movements  via a price-band  mechanism  that draws its financial  backing either from general
government  revenues  or from a special  buffer fund.
The price band outcomes and  und revenues
Consider  a price-taking  country  which hopes  to stabilize  domestic  prices around some moving  average  of
international  prices. For such a country  there are nine exhaustive  possible  states  defined  by the relationships  between
border  prices, the price-band,  and trade flows;  the price-band  may fall in a range in wbich  the county would  always
be a net exporter,  a net importer,  or the price  band may straddle  the point at which domestic  supplies  equal domestic
demand. In addition,  the border price may fall above the band, below the band, or within the band. In operating
a price-band  program,  price-risk  is transferred  from the producers  and consumers  to the govertment or stab;  izton
fund.  The government  fund gains revenues  in some of the states and pays out in other states. In four of the rine
possible states the stabilization  mechanism  would  produce revenue;  in two of the nine states the mechanism  woold
generate a loss; and in three of the states there would be neither a pay-out nor revenues generated.
Figures 1-3 illustrate  the three possible states if the country is a perennial expotter of the "stabilized"
commodity. In Figure 1, the border price (Pw) falls above the upper limit of the price band.  In order to peg
domestic  prices at the top of the band (Pu), the government  would  impose  an export tax equal to Pw minus Pu. If
producers correctly  anticipate  the prevailing  domestic  price, Qs will be produced. At the prevailing  price of Pu
domestic demand will be Qd.  Qs minus Qd will be exported  generating (Pw-Pu)*(Qs-Qd)  in revenues for the
government. Figure 2 illustrates  the state in which the border  price falls below the lower range of the band (PI).
In this case, the government  must first impose an impon lax equal to (Pl-Pw) to prevent less expensive  foreign
supplies from filling  domestic  demand,  then subsidize  exports (Qs-Qd)  by (PI-Pw). The import tax will generate
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Figure 1: Exporter facing world prie  above band.  Figure 2: Exporter facing w  rld prce  below  band.
no  revenues, and  the  net  loss  of  revenues from the
goverment or stabization  find would  equal (Qs-Qd)*(Pl-  Pu  Supply
N).  In Figure 3, the border price falls  wiiin  the price  P  - - - - - - - -
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Flgure 4: Importer facing world price above band.  FIgure 5: Importer facing world price below band.
3profitaile  erxpor  martke  In  wPlition,  imports  (Qd-Qs)
supply
mdst be subsidizec  y (Pw-Pu).  In this state the fund loses
(Pw-Pu)*(Qd-Qs).  Figure 5 illutates  the importing case
when the  border  price  falls below  the price  band.  The  PU  - - - - - - - -
govenment  imposes  an import  tax equal  to (PI-Pw)  which  Pi  - - - -su-nd
generates  (Qd-Qs)*(PI-Pw)  in revenue  for the stabilization  I
fund.  Figue  6 shows the state where the border price falls  Os  Od
within the band, generatng  neither revenue nor losses8  F. gure  6: Importer  fad  og  world  prioe  ban
! inally  Figure  7 illustntes the case when  the price
band  straddles the point at which domestic supplies equal
supply
domestic demand.  When the border prce  falls abo'e  the
upper  range  of  the  price  band  the  country  will be  a net
exporter.  To  bting  the  domestic  price  in line  wits  the  P1
price band (Pu),  the govemment  must impose  an export  tax
equal to (Pw-Pu) which  generates revenues equal to (Pw-
Pu)*(Qs-Qd).  When the world price (Pw')  falls belovw  the  ad  08  Sd'  as
price band, the country is a net importer.  Tbe government  Figure  7: Marginal  trader.
imposes an import tax equal to (Pl-Pw')  and coflects revenue equal to (Pl-Pw')*(Qd'-Qs').  If the price falls witbin
the band, the country may either import or eVport, but taiiffs will be set to zero and no revenues will be generated
or lost.
Welfare  gains  and  losses
By intervening in the domestic market the govemment generates welfare transfers between consumers and
producers  as  well  as  efficiency  loses.  These transfers  occjr  for  each period the  govenmment or  fund manager
intervenes  and may have off-setting effects.  In fact, one of the advantages  of a price-band mechanism is that the
average effect on domesiic prices is neutral-- see Coleman and Larson (1990).  In addition, by stabilizing the price
4component  of producer income the program also generates  a stabilization  benefit  which occurs over tbe life of the
program.  Efficiency  losses 3 and the monets-  transfers between  producers, consumers,  and the govemment ane
readily  calculated  through changes  in the tradtional measures  of consumer u 'producer surplus  which  analyw areas
under the demand and supply curves. These measures  give a general  indicaton of the welfare gains and losses for
each period in which the govenmment  intervenes. 4
Figure 8 illustrates  the consumer,  producer, and
govemment  surpluses  generated  by imposing  an export tax
on an exported good in order to lower domestic  prices.  P___d_
Domestic  prices fall from the border  price of P to P' as the  PI
government imposes a  tax  equal to  (P-P').  Demand
increases from  Qd to Qd' and supplies  decline from Qs to  l
Od Od'  asos
Qs'.  The govermnent  receives revenues  equal to area d;
producer  surplus drops by an amount equal to the sum of  Figure 8:  Income  transfers  and  efficency losses
under an export  tax.
areas a,b,c,d, and e; consumer surplus increases by  an
amount  equal to areas a and b, leaving an efficiency  loss equal to areas c and e.  Generally speaking,  consmer
surplus  is given by:
Pt
ACS  -f D(p,  (1)
pe
where P and P' are the original and altemative  prices respectively,  and where demand  D0p)  is a function  of price.
3Once expected  price replaces  price in the supply equation,  efficiency  losses need not be negative. This result
comes from  the fact that a price band can accidentally  provide  a domestic  price that  is closer  to the actual prevailing
price than the expected price, generating  a positive  efficiency  gain.
4Only under very strong  assumptions  do ordinal  monetawy  measures  of consumer  surplus correspond  to unique
measures  of consumer  welfare. However,  for applied  work  there are few  practical  altematives. See Just, Hueth,  and
Schmitz (1982),  chapter 5 for a discussion  of consumer  surplus and applied economic  analysis.
5Producer  surplus  is similry  defined as:
APS =fS(p)dp  (2)
pi
The change in govenmment  revenues  is given by:
AGR  [S(pQ)  - D(p)]  P 0 - pl.  (3)
The efficiency  loss is defined as:
EL  =  ACS  + APS  + AGR  (4)
The way in which income is transferred,  or lost to inefficiencies,  will vary depending  upon the type of
govemment  intervention  and will differ from period to period as the type of intervention  needed  to deend a price
band changes with intemaional price movements. In general,  the transfers  between  producers,  consumes, and the
Table 1: Producer, consumer, and  govenmrent surplus gains and  losses under  a prce-band  stabization
scheme.
Border priem
Trade State  Above  band  Within band  Bdow bend
Bxxver
Conswcr surplus  gain  neutdal  los0
Proder  suplus  los  neutal  gan
Fund  revenue  gain  nutal  loss
Marginl trader
Consumer  suplus  gain  neutmal  loss
Producer  surplus  loss  neulral  gain
Goveranet  revenue  gain  neutral  gain
Importer
Consumer  surplus  gain  neutals  loss
Producer  suplus  loss  neutral  gain
Govenment  revenue  loss  neutral  gain
govemment  stabilization  fund  are likely to be  offsetting.  Inefficiency losses,  however, are not oifset  and are a
general social cost incurred by operating a price stabilization program.  Table I lists the income transfers associated
6with each of the possible aie  states that can occur undet a price-band  wbeme.
To the exten that producers  prefer stable  Incomes  to unstable  incomes,  additional  benefits  aue  over  the
hfe  of the stabilization  program  based on the efficacy  ot the program  in reducing  income variabty  by reducing  the
vadablity of the price component  of producer  income.5  Newbery  and Stglitz (1981) derived  a quandfiable  measure
of the value of the income stabilization  achieved based on assumptions  conceming the relative risk aversion for
producers. Assuming  that producers  can be teated  as a single aggregated  agent whose utlity can be represented
by a Von-Newman  Morgenstem  Utility function  of income U(Y), average benefits  relative to income are defined
as:
B_ =  _y_o  - 1R(  ,.2  iyiy) 2 - (5)
whete B is the money value of the stabilization  benefits; Y 0. Y, represent  income without  and with a stabiiz*ulon
progam, respectively,  and a bar over a variable represents  the variable's mean; where ad2  is the square of the
coeffident of varioation  for the i,nme  Y;,  and R is the coefficient  of relative risk avesion given by:
R  _y dU(Y)  (6)
U'(Y)
The first term in (5) is a transfer  benefit  resulting  from any change  in the mean level of income,  while the
tem  following  the addition  sign measures  the benefit  directly  attributable  to a reduction  in the variance of income
resuting from a reduction  in the varability of price.  Tbe derivation  of the benefits  formula  is given in Annx  H.
Produce  vers  fund risk
By intervening  at the border, a govemmeim  operating  a price-band  scheme commits its own resource to
offset a portion of the range of international  price movements. Consumers  and especially  producers  gain a risk-
benefit because the risks associated with intemational  price movements  are ttansfred  from individuals  to the
VPotentially,  there is a gain  to consumers  from stable  prices--  see Newbery  & Stiglitz  (1981),  chapter  9; however,
if consunption  substiutes are readily  availeale  or expenditures  on the good are small  relative  to income,  the benefits
will be quantitatively  small.
7govemment  Genrlly,  tis  is asswned to produce a not gain in welfare as the govenmnent  is assmned  to be less
averse  to the risk associated  witl price movements  than individual  producen. Ths is consistet with  one of the few
empirical  studies  of risk  aversion. Using  games  of chance  in mral India  to measure  attitudes  toward  risk, Binswanoe
(1978) concluded  that relative  disk aversion  tended to increase  as the ganble increased  as a portion  of wealth. To
the extent that the total resources of the goveumneni  are less volatle  as a result of price movements  relative to
producer incomes, a stabilization  scheme  and the transfer  of risk should produce a flow of benefits.
Although tt appears  trivial to do so, it should be noted that the d(erived  benefits -f a sta' ilization scheme
flow only  if the stabilization  scheme  remains  operational. Mundalk  and Larson  (1989)  have shown that changes  in
intermational  prioes tend to lead to changes in domestic producer prices, despite an ample number of programs
designed to mitigate  such effects. This result is more general,  but consistent  with the recognized  failure of most
intemadonal  commodity  stabilization  schemes. Wright  and Williamns  (1990) note  that stabilizaton  schemes "almost
never succeed  for very long-- and I do not mean long in the Keynesian  long run.  The founders  easily survive the
life span of the typical  scheme,  physically  if not financially."  The recent  defise of two  higly-regarded stabilzation
schemes,  wool in Australia,  and programs  for cocoa,  palm oil, copra, and coffee  in Papua New Guinea  emphasises
the file  nature of stabllization  programs. And when formerly  successfd stiization  programs  do fail, it is
unclear whether the beLefits  accumulated  during the fumntioning  life of the program outweigh  the abrupt maiket
reactions  and the ensuing adverse  effects as the mechanism  cmmbles. 6
Stabilization  programs  can use discretionary  rules to stabilize  prices around some  expert  or legislated  notion
of the correct long-run prices or can use fixed nrles to define the range in which  prices should be defended. 7
Unforunately, computer simulations  demonstrate  that extremely simple prioe movements,  such as a log-normal
random walk, can lead to  exteme  price distibutions.  Stabilization schemes which tequire the defense of
'Akiyama and Varangis (1989) simulated the long-term eftects of the International  Coffee Agreement and
concluded  that the long-term  production  and price effects of the agreement  were smaU  but that the shon-tn  effects
of the agreement's dissolution  were large.
7The Australian  Wool Fund is an examr.ple  of the fonner and the Papua New Guinea stabilization  programs
exanples of the latter.
8unreasonable  price levels will fail and fail rapidly,  however,  there remains a great deal of uncertainty as  to whether
a "reasonable"  price band can ever be defined. For example,  Wright  and Williams  (1990)  used computer  simulations
to demonstrate  that a simple  autocorrelated  price mechanism  can generate  samples of 50,000  observatlons  in which
tbere remains a greater than 5% chance of improperly identifying a stationary-meau  by more than a standard
deviation.
Rules can be used to generate a stabilization  scheme d4at contains  some feed-back and tewefore wme
adjustment  mechanism. However,  as the simulations  later  demonstrate,  the ability  of the fund  to remain  liquid, given
a  limited borrowing capacity, is primarily a matter of luck.  lTis  is perbaps the most frequent reason why
stabilization  schemes  fail. At the same  time, the following  section  lays out a strategy  of hedging which can greatly
reduce the variability  of stabilization  fund payouts and thereby help the fund manager survive small doses of bad
luck.
Hedging fund risk
Of the nine possible states relating  prices and trade which  can occur under a price-band  measm,  only
2 create  a liability  for a stabilzation  fund, while four
of the states generate nrvenues (see Table I.)  In
addition,  the liability faced by the fund is limited;
however,  the limit may be quite large. Conversely,  Potential  tax  re/nue
Pu
the potential  for tax revenue  is aot bot Aded. Figure  pi
I\ otental  payout
9  Aliustrates  the case for an exporter.  Ihe  area
above the price band and between  the supply and
demand curves is unbounded  above and represents
the potential area that the could be used to finae  Figure 9: Poenta  tax revenue and tand  payout.
a stabilization  fiud via an export tax.  The area between  the lower range of the price band and the demand and
supply  curves at PI down to the axis represents  the maximum  payout from the fund for an exporter. However,  the
value of this area goes to zero as the lower range of the price band falls. A similar situation  exists for the other
9"liable"  state, the case of subsidized  imports. 8 For the exporter  case, the maximum  fimd liability  has the following
characteristics  as prices fall:
lm,,.(p,-p)[S(p)-D(pv)]  ,  (
where S(pm)  = D(pm).
Fo. the ces  of the importer:
llmp,  <P,,  (p  -p) [S(p.)  D(pa)]  0,(8
where S(p,) = D(p.).
For commodity  markets  in which futures are available,  the fund can futher  estrict the payout by buying
options  to hedge  the fund's liability. Consider  the following  example. In period one,  produces, consumers  and fund
managers  know what the price band will be, but do not know the stochastic  component  of the interationad price.
Furthermore,  the fund  manager  knows  the demand  and supply  curves  of the relevant  commodity. In period two, the
stochastic  component  and therefore  the international  price will be revealed  and the fund  manager  wil have to defend
the pnce band.  In order to lmit the potential  payout from the fumd,  the fund manager looks at dt  range of the
prices covered  by the band. If the country  would  export over the entire range of the band (see Figre  2), the fund
faces a liability only if the international  price in period 2 were to fall below the lower range, that is, below P1.
Therefore to hedge that liability,  the fund manager  hedges  the quantity  S(Pl)-D(PI)  by purcasing  put-tdons  at a
strike price of Pi, for a delivery  date corresponding  to period 2.  Should  the border  price actually  fail below Pt, the
added value of the put option would compensate  the fund for additional  oudays.  The fund's liability is thereby
limited to the purchase cost of the options.
In the case where  the range  of the price-band  implies  that the country  will be an importer,  the fund is liable
when the border  price falls above the upper bound of the price-band  range (see Figure  4.)  In this case, the fund
manager can limit the fund's liablity by hedging the quantity [D(Pu)-S(Pu)]  tirough the purchase of calls for a
'1n the importer  case,  total import tax revenues  are bounded  as well, but only by the nonnegativity  condition  on
prices.
10stike-ptice of Pu for delivery in period 2.  Should the border price fall above Pu, the increased  value of the call
options would  compensate  the fund for additional  payouts.
The value of the strategy  will of course  depend  upon  the nature  of the stochastic  price  element  and the path
of the resuldting  prices.  Analytic  answers may be derived  based on the underlying  parameters of the problem  and
price expectations;  but while such results  may hold under large-sample  conditions,  the small-sample  properdes are
more important  as &  practical matter.  In order to calculate  the benefits of a stabilization  program as well as the
returns  to hedging to consequential  fnd  risks, a computer  simulation  model was constructed  which is presented  in
the following  section.
Model description: production and the price-band mechaxIsm
The model  is designed  to simulate  a fairly  simple set of actions  for producers,  consumers,  and government
ofF ials  operating in a price-taking country which has instituted a price-band and uses import tariffs and subsidies
to defend the band. T'he  band operates  for a single crop  for which there  are no close substitutes. In order  to finance
the enforcement  of the band, the fund may freely  borrow  in simulation. Te  crop is annual and takes 120 days to
mature. At the beginning  of the period fanners evaluate  their expectations  of the price they will receive for their
crop and plant accordingly. Expectations  are rational. In the case where intemational  prices (p ) are assumed  to
follow a log-normal  random  walk9,  i.e.,
Pt  p: ,'  I  V where In(e) - N(p,o)  (9)
Ii  .1Z  ~~~~~~~~~(10)
E(e) = e2,(0
so that
InE,p)  = Inp:_,  I  +22  when  i  =0  (11)
When the govemment  operates  a price-band,  the farmer  is assumed  to fully recognize  the consequences  of
the band and adjust his expectations  of the domestic  price (pd)  accordingly  so that
'See Aitcheson  and Brown (1957) for a discussion  of expectations  and log-normal  errors.
11I,f s  d  Egl  (12)+l
where the uppr  (po)  and lower (p') prices given by the ptice-band rules are known without  error to the farmer.
Domesdc production  is a function of expected domesfic prices, while total demand occus  120 days later
and is a funio  of actual  domestic  price, i.e., after  the random  element  has been revealed. Trade  makes up the gap
(positive  or negative)  between  supply and demand. Ihe demand  and supply  acres  axe  assumed  to be log-linear  and
are of the form:
InS,  =  ln(lQO)  + elnE(p,)  (13)
and
lnD,  In(100)  - edlnod).  (14)
where ed and e, are constant  demand  and supply elasticities.
The find manager  evaluates  expected  supply and demand  and therefore  trade at both the upper and lower
levels of the prie  band. If, over the band, the country  is exclusively  and importer  or exporter  (that is, the country
is not a marginal  trader) then he hedges  the fund's liability:  purchasing  puts at a strike price equal to the lower level
of the price-band  if the country  exports at that  price level, or buying  calls at a stike price equal to the upper level
of the price band if the country  expects  to import the commodity.  The quantity  hedged  is equal to the trade  volume
at the strike price.  The prices of the options are calculated  using the Black-Scholes  option-pricing  model and is
based on expected  prices, an annualized  interest rate of 6.0%, and an expected coefficient  of variation  based on a
five-peiiod  moving  average  calculation. Each option  is held for 120  days. After 120  days, the  mue  price is revealed
as is domestic  consumption  and trade. Based on the revealed  price, the manager  liquidates  the options if they have
value,  collects  any  relevant taxes, and  pays out any relevant  subsidies  based  on actual  trade. The demand  and supply
elascities  used throughout  the base-run of the simulation  were -0.5 and 0.8 respectively.
12Simulation results on prices and welfare changes
The model described above was used to generate ten samples, each containing observations  for 500
iterations. The simulations  were dynamic  within each of the samples, that is, at the beginning  of each of the ten
samples the international  price was set to 1 with a random  walk generating  prices for the next 499 observations  in
the sample.  The fund manager  started each sample with zero reserves, but could borrow feely.  The manager
operated a price-band  system with the upper and lower bands based on 110% and 90% of a five-period  moving
average,  respectively. Table 2 summarizes  the settings  for the control variables  in the base-simulation.
Table 3 summarizes  some of the simulation  results for the price variables and reveals the undedying
Table 2: Control variable settings in base simulation.
Description  of
Control  variables  Seting
sample  size  500
Number  of samples  10
type of price movement  log-nommal  random  walk
error distribution  log of error is distributed  N(O,.0l)
price expectations  rational
starting value of price  1.0
Initial stabilization fund value  0.0
initial trading volume  self-sufficient, 0 exports
price band rules  plus/minus 10% of moving fivelpeiod  averae
option pricing method  Black-Scholes
delivery date on underlying future  120 days
period option held  120 days
interest rate  6.0%
C.V. used in option  pricing  based on moving  five-period  sample
domestic demand elasticity  -0.5
domestic supply elasticity  0.8
difficulties  faced by the fund manager.' 0 Even though  he may understand  the underlying  price mechanism  as well
as the intricacies of his own domestic market, the cumulative  effects of random components  can lead to very
different  price paths. Recognizing  a "reasonable"  long-rn price may be impossible  and,  even if possible,  irrelevant
"A more complete  reporting  is  given in Annex 1.
13Table 3: Summary results for key price variables across base scenario  simulated samples.
Mean range  Minimum  Maztmuw
Variable  across samples  value  value
Border price  0.20 to 13.77  0.02  49.18
Donestic  price  0.20 to 13.73  0.02  47.61
Log of error  0.00 to 0.01  -0.36  0.38
in the "short-run"  --the short run in this case being 500 years.
Before turning to the question of how the fund is financed, it is perhaps best to consider how the
stabilization  program performs. While results from all ten base simulation  samples are given in Annex  I, Table 4
provides  some summary  results for three of the samples  from which several  conclusions  can be drawn. Fistly, the
information  on domestic and border  prices restates,  in a slightly different  way, the information  contained  in Table
3 and supports  the general  conclusion  that the random  component  of the price stmcture can generate  very diffewent
sample price distributions. This is reflected  in the differing ranges within samples and the varying  means and
coefficients  of variation  across  samples. The second  implication  is that  the average  effects of the price-band  system
on producer, consumer,  or govenmment  welfare are smaU  (less than 2% of average producer income), while the
single-year  effects can be quite large (multiple  factors  of average oroducer  income.) The price-band  system  is able
to reduce the coefficient  of price variation  as wel as producer  income variability,  but again,  the average  effects ame
quite small.  The stabilization  programs ame  rougly  self-financing,  but the year-to-year  variation in revenues or
payments is quite large.
Table 5 provides  the value of the stabilization  prgram  to producers  as a percentage  of their non-stabilized
14Table 4: Summary results on welfare effesb for selected simulation samples.
VartabLe  Mean  Minimum  Mwlmum  C.V.
Sample 1
Wodd  price  0.30  0.03  1.21  98.63
Domestc pevailing price  0.30  0.03  1.14  97.16
Comnmr  wlfare change  -0.75  -28.14  23.86  -898.59
Producer  surplus  change,  exclusive  of risk  benefits  0.02  -17.86  9.39  11,830.86
Goverrunent  surplus  change,  wthout hedging  0.45  -16.76  20.53  1,125.37
Stanxdd eficiency loss  4.29  -6.08  4.70  -325.76
Producer  Incone without  stabilization  program  22.28  0.65  127.47  136.97
Producer income  with  stabilzation  program  22.31  0.66  123.18  134.83
Sample  4
World  price  12.53  1.04  49.18  85.48
Domestic  prevailing  price  12.38  1.04  47.61  85.31
Consume welfare  change  1.96  45.94  47.77  565.85
Producer urplus  change,  exclusive  of risk benefts  -51.81  -2,495.25  2,299.26  -715.08
Government  smplus change,  withou hedging  54.74  -3,421.58  3,337.53  884.98
Standard  efficiency  loss  4.89  -1,151.17  940.21  3,197.41
Producer  income  without  stabilization  progran  5,532.67  104.19  33,974.97  124.33
Producer  income  with sabilization  progran  5,454.95  104.19  32,851.00  124.07
Sample  9
World  price  0.35  0.05  1.31  80.85
Domaetic  prevailing  price  0.35  0.05  1.31  80.72
Cosmer  welfare  change  4.48  -32.32  25.07  -1,316.90
Producer  surplus  change,  exclusive  of risk benits  0.18  -16.67  16.49  1,412.03
Government  surplus  change,  without  hedging  0.04  -21.79  16.87  11,228.17
Standard  effciency loss  -0.27  -8.65  3.54  -394.74
Producer  Income  without  stabilization  progran  25.29  1.04  148.73  125.04
Protducer  income  with stabilization  progran  25.56  1.05  148.73  124.29
revenues."  The results, which are expressed  as a percentage  of producer income, are quite revealing. Across  all
simulations,  the values of the stabilization  programs  to producers  were exceedingly  small. While it can be argued
that relative  risk avetsion changes  at varying  levels of income,  it is clear that, on average,  a very low tarff  (for net
importers)  or export subsidy  (for net exporters)  would generate  the same level of income benefits  to producers  as
does a more complicated  stabilization  program. Across all of the samples,  producers received a non-negative  net
welfire gain  (trnsfer benefit  plus risk  benefit)  from the stabilization  programs,  but not all risk benefits  were positive,
despite the fact that the stabilizaton programs  were successful  in reducing  the variability  of ptices.  In samples 2
"For the purposes of evaluating  the simulation  benefits, the coefficient of relative risk aversion given in
equations 5 and 6 was assumed  to equal 1.5.
ISand 9 the reduction  was so small, however,  that the  Table 5:  Producer  transfer  and  risk  benefits  to
simulated stabilization programs.
ad4stment  for income changes  - see equation  (5) -
overwhelmed  the small  reduction  in income  variability.  Sampl  Transfer  benefit  Risk benflt
Simulation resudts on fund  finandug  1  0.13  4.00
2  1.07  -0.38
Results from the previous section indicated  3  0.22  0.62
4  -1.40  3.70
that while the benefits of a stabilization  progran may  5  0.15  2.94
6  0.39  2.65
be small,  the programs  tend  to be self-financing  and  7  1.35  5.98 8  -0.23  0.64
9  1.05  -1.06
can generate  substantial  single-period  income benefits.  10  0.35  292
Results in  Table 6 show that borrowings are often
needed to keep the fund in operation,  and that the frequency  and value of the bonowings will usually be reduced
though hedging. Fund borrowings  will not necessarily  be eliminated  by hedging and the primary  detenninant of
whether or not the fund must borrow  heavily is luck.  This fact is underscored  by the great range of indebtedness
the samples  generated. In some cases the fund  blithely  passed  the entire period  with  positive  balances,  while in other
Table 6: Effects of hedging on stabilizaton  fund borrowing.
Number of times  Maomum debt  as  percentage
fund  borroia  of  average producer income
Sample  Unhedged  Hedged  Unhedged  Hedged
I  0  0
2  6  5  -3.31  -5.23
3  262  0  -130.89  -
4  0  0
5  156  18  -73.76  -20.67
6  12  0  -43.91  _
7  22  22  -0.00  -0.00
8  13  0  -0.54  --
9  51  59  -170.34  -197.85
10  161  157  -392.01  -381.03
cases, the fund manager was forced to borrow the equivalent of the value of four year's  worth of production.
What  then,  is  the  value  of  hedging  to  a  fund  manager?  Assuming that  the  government  or  agency
administering  the stabilization  scheme  has an aggregate  utility function  that  can be characterized  in the same  manner
16as that of the producers, transfer  and stabilization  benefits  derived from hedging activities  can be calculated  uswing
an identical  approach. Define average govemment  benefits from hedging as:
,AR  'I=  T  + iRS(Tf)[o2r(TIT)2-o2T1.  (15
where To and T, are average net revenues (taxes minus subsidies)  under a stabilization  program with and without
hedging operations--  a bar over the variable represents  the mean of that variable; (4T  is the coefficient  of vaiaron
associated  with flows in and out of the fund; and RI is the government's  coefficient  of relative risk aversion  with
respect  to fund flows.' 2 It is assumed  throughout  the remaining  analysis  that  the govenmment  is unitarily  tisk-averse,
i.e. that RI = 1.  The hedging operation  generates a pure transfer (positive  or negative) between the fund and
speculators  who take the opposite  position  on fund  option  trades-the first term in equation  (14), plus a "risk"  benefit
which comes from reducing the variability of the fund flows.  Both are expressed as a share of the average
"unhedged"  fund income.
Table 7: Effects of hedging on fund iAcome  and fund risk.
Avrge  fund flow  % C.V. of fund Income  Benditas  as % of fid  _
Sample  Unhedged  hedged  Unhedged  Hedged  Tlnsfer  Risk
1  0.45  0.52  1,125  878  16  1,097
2  0.32  -0.21  942  1,240  -27  371
3  -0.93  1.97  -4,489  1,715  -310  35,822
4  54.74  86.21  884  477  58  1,089
5  0.03  0.13  18,129  3,506  345  424,956
6  0.28  0.37  1,795  1,187  32  3,915
7  12.77  26.77  2,130  902  110  4,810
8  7.52  44.86  6,100  853  496  56,600
9  0.04  0.02  11,228  17,786  -43  116,543
10  0.00  -0.04  - - - -
The effects of hedging  the fund revenues  are reported  in Table 7. Since the average  income flows into the
2When  the fund is hedged the costs of purchasing  the options as well as the revenues generated  by exercising
"winning"  options are included  in T.
17fund are close  to zero, the traditional  meas.:res  of benefits,  which  are expressed  as a percentage  of income,  take on
very large values;  however,  it is clear from the large reduction  in the C.V. of fund irn 3me  that the hedging  strategy
usually reduces  the variability  of fund income flows. The income transfers  which measure  the simple value of the
strategy are both positive and negative; the calculated  value of the benefit  of reducing  the variability  of the fund
flows are all extremely  large with regard to the average fund income.
While  the benefits  of the stabilization  scheme  in genemal  may be suspect,  the benefits  of hedging  an existing
stabilization  fund are clear and substantial  under the assumptions  made to this point.  The following  sections are
devoted to testing the robustness  of these results under different  assumptions.
Alternative scenarios
As discussed  earlier, fund liabilites can only  exist when  the price-band  does not include the price at which
the country  would be self-sufficient. However,  when the country  is either exclusively  an exporter  or imposter  over
the range of possible  prices, only  three  possible  states can exist:  one of which  is revenue  neutral,  one which  generates
revenues  for the fund and one which  taps  the fiund's  resomures.  To test whether  the simulation  results  teported  earlier
are sensitive  to a change in the possible states, two alternative  scenarios  were simulated. By shifling supply and
demand  intercepts,  the simulation  model was adjusted  to simulate  exporter  and imponer nations.
In practice,  price-band  schemes  are often  based on nominal  prices,  since  measures  of inflation  are fiequently
revised. At the same time, since the price-band  rules are often based on moving  averages,  current inflation enters
the price band with a lag. Under  such circumstances,  the upper limit of the price-band  becomes  more binding  than
the lower band. By adding a positive drift term, the model was altered so that nominal prices would slowly rise
throughout  the simulation  periods.
The effects of these altemative  simulations  on producer welfare  are reported in Table 8.  More detailed
results on the simulations  are reported  in Annex I.  As in the base simulation,  the net effects on produrer welfare
are aU relatively  small; however,  the risk benefits  are slighdy larger (and all positive),  especially for the case in
which noninal prices drift upward.
Table 9 reports the altemative  simulation  effects on government  welfare. Again,  the results  are consistent
18Table 8: Producer benidtls under alternadve simuladon scenarioL.
linporter  case  Exsporter cse  Upward  drif  case
Sample  Trll  er  Rbik  Transer  Risk  Transer  R4sk
1  -1.6  9.8  1.0  0.4  -2.0  5.8
2  -0.6  3.5  -1.1  4.9  -2.6  17.7
3  -10.0  3.9  -0.3  3.0  -2.2  6.1
4  -0.3  1.2  -1.5  5.3  -4.8  34.8
5  -0.6  2.6  0.4  5.7  -1A4  3.7
6  -1.2  5.1  -0.2  6.8  -2.0  12.6
7  -2.6  18.9  -0.9  5.4  -2.4  8.4
8  -0.4  1.6  .0.6  2.2  -1.1  2.0
9  -1.6  3.0  -1.9  9.7  3.7  73.4
10  -2.8  18.8  -1.8  8.9  -0.7  1.9
Table 9: Government benefits under altenmative  simulations.
Importer case  Exporter  case  Upward  drift  case
smple  Transfer  Risk  Trnfer  Risk  Tranl er  Risk
1  -442  65,453  -97  1,844  39  368
2  288  232,001  111  3,851  23  252
3  -10  2,983  1,454  915,127  33  526
4  -22  59,181  98  2,409  11  112
5  -1S  4,917  -183  14,261  68  113
6  -3C  1,108  442  52,823  35  563
7  24  698  148  4,976  31  280
8  50  32,654  199  6,719  87  1,921
9  -23  1,246  31  414  73  1,190
10  -12  1,462  34  660  237  11,372
with eadlier findings.  Hedging the fwnd  tends to generate quite large welfare gains to the extent that the govemment
or fund agency is risk averse.  All scenarios generated positive risk benefits, while the transfer effects were mixed,
depending upon the luck of the draw.  In the case of an upward price drift, the transfer benefits were positive as well
since the government was able to tax more frequently.
Deterministic  price  movements
To this point,  the results have been based on the assumption that price movements drift  randomly.  This
19assumption  is extreme In that behavioral forces inherent in supply and demand schedules have been ignord  In this
secton  an opposlte,  but equally naive altermative  assumption  is used to derive  sinilar results. Rather than facing
a random-walk  intenamoal price,  the price-taking  country  faces  prices from a deteministic international  commodity
mart  consisting  of supply and demand  functions. Intemational  supplies are confounded  by an aditive  random
error. In general, economic  maikets are filled with both deterministic  and stocbasic components. Agents act on
imperfect  information  about  input prices  and supplies,  consumer  income,  and the prices of substitute  and compliment
goods. As in any system, if the economic  processes  are complex  enough, the system variables  may have many of
the characterisfics  that we would  normally  associate  with stochastic  variables,  even though  they arise from a mixed
stochastic-deteministic  system. However,  it is hoped  that results  that are consistent  under two extreme  assumptions
in simulaton, will prove robust  in more complicated  reaity that falls somewhere  between  the two models.
In the expanded  modeL  equation (9) is dropped and replaced by three additional  equations and two more
variables,  intemational  supply,  S', and intemational  demand,  D'.  D' contains  domestic  consumption,  given in (14),
but, consistent  with the price-taling assumption,  domestic  demand  is small enough relative  to intenational demand
that it can safely be ignored. The international  demand  schedule  is assumed  to be log-normal  and is given by:
hnDg  = Ind.  - e:lin(p:)  (16)
where  e'd is a constant  intemational  demand  elasticity.
The supply  equation  is Nerlovian,  implying  a short-run  supply elasticity  different  from the long-run  steady-
state supply elasticity  and is given by
InS, = Ins,  - e'lnE(p:) + InS, 1 - v,  (17
where v is normally distributed  N(0,a 2), where e', is the constant  short-run price elasticity and where e'J(l-l',)
provides the steady-state  elasticity  when S, = St.
For simulation  purposes,  stock changes are set equal to zero so that:
Combining  (16) and (17) into (18) yields:
20.S,  =D,  for all t.  (8
1npr  t[In(sS4i)  + l,  InS,_X  + v,J  (19)
Noting  that:
E[exp(  v.# |  -8i  I  212  [  (20)
so that
E(p 1 p) - I-oI(S, 1)2expI-,  where y  (21)
do  ~~  2y  -el
In addition,  since Di  S' for all values of p including  the steady-state  St:
lnso =  (1-1)1n4,  since Jim14 S'(1)  - D*(l)  (22)
Table 10 sunmaiizes some of the simulations  results for the price variables  using the determinsdc model.
Because of the feedback  between intemational  prices and intemational  demand and supply, the range of values
Table 10: Summary results for key price variables across determInstlc-model simulated  samples
Mean  range  Minimum  Maximum
Variable  across samples  value  value
Border  price  0.99  to 1.02  0.62  1.55
Domestic  price  0.98  to 1.02  0.73  1.33
Log of enr  -0.01  to 0.01  -0.36  0.33
assumed  by the price variables  under simulation  is much more narrow. Given  the extremely  limited  price volaility
21under the detenninstic model simulations  producer transfer  and risk benefits  generated  by futher stabilizing  the
domestic  price were essentially  zero for most of the simulations. (See Annex  I for details.) However,  even though
the stabilization  program themselves  generated  no real benefits,  hedging the stabilization  fund did prove to be a
worthwhile  endeavor.
Table  11 sihows  the effects of hedging on fund income and fund risk under the deterministic  model
Table 11: Effects of hedging on fund income and fund risk under determnstlc  pricing modeL
Average fund flow  % C.V. of fland incoe  Benfutb  os  sf  afund  tarkm
Sample  Unhedged  bedged  Unhedged  Hedged  Tranfer  Risk
I  0.51  1.56  1,453  382  2  37
2  0.55  1.68  1,415  386  2  30
3  0.53  1.50  1,532  453  2  35
4  0.51  1.59  1,572  414  2  39
5  0.28  1.29  2,537  442  4  10
6  0.54  1.70  1,541  408  2  36
7  0.48  1.47  1,459  393  2  35
8  0.52  1.62  1,395  361  2  35
9  0.42  1.61  2,133  449  3  78
10  0.44  1.47  1,649  393  2  48
simulations. T'e  results on hedging funds ame  consistent  with those repored earlie.  Since the feed-back  of the
deterministic-priing  model  leads  to similar  price soenarios  under each  of the simulations,  the results  on fund-hedging
are more consistent  as well.
Conclusions
Casual observation  leads to the conclusion  that  stabiLization  fiuds tend to be short-lived. While it may be
that some funds have failed due  to poor management or unwarranted political interventions, the stochastic
components  of commodity  ptices can generate  insunmountable  difficulties  for even  the most expert  managers. Price-
band schemes contain  an element of infonnation  feed-back  and offer trarsparent  rules-- attributes  which make such
schemes preferable  to many altemative  mechanisms--  but the benefits to producers tend to be, on average, quite
small. Similar  average  benefits  can be generated  with  very small  import taxes or producer  subsidies. Nonetheless,
such schemes  can have large single-year  efiects.
22The simulation  results  demonstate that, if adopted,  such funds should be ihedged  unless the government  is
not at all adverse  to the fund's financial  failure. Still,  hedged  or unhedged,  such funds will, with  eventual  ceraity,
generate  large levels  of debt as a statistically  "rare"  sequence  of events  mist eventually  occur. By hedgng, the flnds
are more likely to survive in the short-run.
23Annex  I: Simulation  results for key variables
Table 1: Base simulation  - summary  statistics on simulation  price variables.
SQm*le  Mt  tDS  v  Mdniuzm  Mauluns  C.V.
Sample  I
Log of enor-em  .0,01  0.10  .0.27  0.27  -. 11S.66
Wodld  pdce  0.30  0.30  0.03  1.21  9S.6
Domestic  prevailng  pice  0.30  0.30  0.03  1.14  97.16
Expected world pice  0.31  .30  0.03  1.22  98.46
Expected domestic pdie  0.31  0.30  0.03  1.17  97.64
Sample 2
Log of er-term  4.01  0.10  Q25  027  *169Q97
Wodd pike  0.20  0.24  0.02  1.14  119A9
Domesdc prvaiUng prke  0.20  024  0.02  1.08  118.71
Expected world pice  0.20  0.24  0.02  1.14  119.64
Bxpected domeatdc  price  0.20  0.24  0.02  1.09  119.00
Sample 3
Log of err-tm  0.00  0.10  4.37  U3S  94488s
Wodd p1ice  2.14  1.71  0.20  10.13  79.92
Domestc pevadikg  price  2.14  1.70  0.20  9.95  79.40
Expected world ptice  2.15  1.72  020  10.18  80OI
Expected domesdc price  2.15  1.71  0.20  1O1IS  79.76
Sample 4
L*g of enter-m  0.01  0tO  423  0.27  1335.93
Would  price  123  10.71  .^4  49.18  S5.48
Domestic prevaIUng  price  12.38  10.56  1.04  47.61  85.31
Expected world price  12.52  10.73  B.01  49.43  85.67
Expected domesdc price  1243  10.65  1.01  48.7  85.66
Sample 5
Log of enw-tenm  .0.00  0.10  *0.33  032  -2869.57
Wo-ld prce  0.45  0.42  0.06  1.95  92.70
Domestic  prevailing price  0.46  OA2  0.07  1.95  91.77
Expected world price  0.46  OA2  0.06  1.96  92.47
Expected domesdc price  Q46  0.42  0.07  1.96  91.83
Sample 6
Log of enor-term  40.00  0.10  40.29  0.29  .2129.81
Wodd price  0.38  0.32  Q09  1.52  85.50
Domestic ptevliflg  price  0.38  032  0.09  1.40  84.49
Bxpected worM  pice  0.38  0.33  0.09  1.53  85.35
Expected dsxnesdc  price  038  0.32  0.09  1.43  462
Sample 7
Log of enor-term  0.01  0.10  4Q29  .25  178293
World pdce  5.64  4.99  Q46  24.06  8SA0
DomestIc pevanirg  pice  5.59  4.90  0.46  21.13  87.72
Expected world prce  3.64  5.00  OA6  24.18  8a8
Bxpected dmdec  price  5.60  4.93  046  22AO  88.05
Sample 8
Log of error-term  0.01  0.10  *0.32  0.26  143.06
World price  13.77  1OA8  Q62  35.85  76.12
Domestc prevailing prie  13.73  10.45  0.68  34.4S  7611
Expected world price  13.81  10.55  0.63  3603  76.38
Expected dmestdc  price  13.80  10.54  0.66  36.03  76.40
Sample 9
Log of egor-tem  40.00  0.10  40.36  0.33  .2731.12
Wodd pice  0.35  0.28  0.05  1.31  80.85
Domestic prevailng  prce  0.35  Q28  0.05  1.31  8072
Expected world pice  0.35  0.29  0.05  1.31  8.84
Expected domestic price  0.35  0.29  0.05  1.31  80.83
Sample 10
Log of eur-rtrm  0.00  0.10  40.31  1o.29  -2868.83
Wodd prie  0.31  0.23  0.08  1.49  74.63
Domeside  prevailing prie  0.31  0.23  0.09  1.39  74.08
Expected world price  0.31  0.23  0.08  1.50  74.88
Expected domeadc price  0.31  0.23  0.09  1.47  74.47Annex I: Simulation results for key variables
Table 2: Base simulation  -Producer  income,  and changes  in producer,  consumer,  and government  welfare.
Sample  Meon  Minmum  hMasimnu  % CV  Skewnam  Burteeb
Sample I
Consumer welhfe  change  .0.73  -?8.14  23.86  -898.59  .0.13  2.38
Producer welfare chang,  exdusv  of rbk benomfit  0.02  -17.86  9.39  1183036  -2.64  21.82
Governent  welfare change, without hedging  0.45  -16.76  20.53  1125.37  0.05  2.07
overnment welfae  change, with hedging  0.52  -11.10  20.53  878.92  0.79  1.93
Stasndrd eficiency  los  -0.29  -6.08  4.70  -325.76  -1.50  11.35
Producer Inome  wihout  stbiiatIon  progwrm  22.28  0.65  127.47  136.97  1.63  1.63
Producer income with stabiton  pogran  22.31  0.66  123.18  134.83  1.56  1.28
Saplb  2
Consmer  welfae  change  -0.75  -33.75  17.39  -736.53  -1.20  5.50
Producer welfae  change. exdusive  of risk benefit  0.09  -9.22  16.96  1776.92  3.02  37.86
Govennt  welfae  diange, without hedging  0.44  -13.60  16.67  941.98  0.46  2.83
Governmnt  welfare change, with hedging  0.32  -9.96  16.67  1240.11  1.08  2.50
3tandsrd efficiency la  4021  -9.59  3.76  -387.93  -4.70  43.65
Producer income without stabllltlon  prgamm  12.84  0.22  109.19  176.96  2.62  6.34
Produer  income with stabilizatlon progran  12.98  0.22  108.34  175.23  2.54  5.71
Sample 3
Comer  welfae  change  -0.34  -54.15  28.80  -2597.42  -1.14  5.93
Produer  welfte  change, exdusive of risk benefit  0.56  -229.39  2e5.72  6593.2  1.30  2029
Goveument  welfaeb  nge, without hedgn  40.94  -361.08  259.05  -4489.22  -1.83  28.8
Govermment  welfes  change, with hedging  1.97  -258.11  259.04  1715.30  0.89  27.15
Standaud  efficien  loss  40.71  -118.62  92.57  -1958.D0  -1.79  26.48
Producer income without stlzataIn  progmm  381.03  9.05  3117.33  122.11  2.82  10.34
Producer  hime with stabilization pcogran  381.88  9.05  3060.14  121.50  2.79  10.06
Sample 4
Conumer  welfare change  1.96  -45.94  47.77  565.85  0.97  4.12
Producer welfare change, exdcusive  of risk benefit  -51.81  -2495.25  2299.26  -715.  -1.36  16.23
Governent  welfaue change, whhout hedging  54.74  -3421.58  3337.53  884.98  1.21  20.28
Govemment wefare  change, with hedging  86.22  -1216.35  3337.53  477.41  4.09  23.18
Standard efficien  lo  4.89  -1151.17  940.21  3197.41  0.25  18.35
Producer  nome  without stabilization progrm  5532.67  104.19  33974.97  124.33  1.79  2.38
Producer inconm with statiaon  program  5454.95  104.19  32851.00  124.07  1.75  2.14
Sample 5
Consumer welfare change  -0.43  -32.72  33.87  -1731.32  -0.01  4.21
Producer welfarechange,  exduive  of risk benefit  0.04  -38.14  38.10  13670.45  -0.03  22.19
Government welfare change, without hedging  0.03  -38.77  18.87  18129.65  -1.48  10.05
Govemment welfare change  with hedging  0.13  -23.45  18.87  3506.83  -0.10  4.46
Standard efficiency loss  -0.37  -15.78  6.05  -484.30  -3,84  28.84
Producer incOme  without stabilization pfOam  39.72  1.72  259.53  132.07  191  3.51
Producer income with stabilization progm  39.78  1.90  259.53  130.38  1.83  3.14
Sample 6
Consumer welfare cbange  -0.67  -33.39  29.84  -1055.71  -0.37  5.11
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  0.08  -26.56  17.76  3755.69  -1.23  28.26
Governmat  welfare change, without hedging  0.28  -27.03  21.43  1794.73  -0.60  6.72
Government welfare change, with hedging  0.37  -15.94  21.43  1186.66  0.78  4.81
Standard efficiency lo6  -0.32  -8.50  4.83  -389.66  -2.75  15.25
Poducer  income without saIization  piogram  28.83  2.68  177.76  130.28  1.92  2.60
Producer income with stabUlzation program  28.94  2.81  157.74  128.42  1.83  2.08
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Table 2: Base simulation  -Producer income  and changes  in producer.  consumer,  and goverfnment  welfare
(continued.)
Sample  Mean  Mkinium  Maximum  % CV  Skmnm  Ktsrtxdl
Sample 7
Consumer welhue change  1.18  -58.11  58.92  1006.06  .0.23  5.66
Producer velfae  change, exdusive of risk benefit  -15.24  -1634.54  1335.14  -1525.73  -120  17.50
Govenmt  welfardchange,  without hedging  12.77  -1531.09  1776.72  2129.73  0.66  17.53
Oovernment welfae change, with hedging  26.77  -1476.05  1776.66  901.53  2.19  21.51
Standard efficiency loss  -1.29  -500.74  393.93  -5100.16  -1.42  21.35
Producer incom  wxthot stabilization  program  1698.25  31.20  11479.36  126.22  1.80  2.87
Produer bnomweith  staballAtln  ptogamm  1675.39  31.20  10003.33  124.70  1.68  2.09
Sampne  8
Consumr welfar chanpe  0.94  48.19  42.82  1170.91  -0.31  4.58
Producer welfae  change, exclude  of risk beneflt  -9.57  -1395.64  2153.71  -3857.61  1.21  9.84
Govemment  welfire change, without hedging  7.52  -2943.22  1850.00  6100.57  -1.19  10.78
Govemnment  vwefue  change,  with bedgig  44.86  -2384.77  1850.00  852.66  -0.14  12.31
Stabdard  ef&nqey  los  -1.12  -1000.22  623.45  -11099AO  -1.06  15.98
Producer  INnnme  without stabization  Program  6261.17  52.06  21509.58  93.35  0.46  -1.17
Producer Inonme  with satbiiation program  6246.81  56.56  20247.33  93.10  OA2  -1.24
Samplb 9
Consmer welfae change  -048  -32.3?  25.07  -1316.90  -OA6  4.90
Producer  welfae  change, exclusive of risk beefit  0.18  -16.67  16.49  1412.03  1.49  21.79
Government  welfare change,  widtot  hedging  0.04  -21.79  16.87  11228.17  -1.07  5.66
Governnent  welfare  change, with heding  0.02  -15.56  16.87  17786.99  -0.12  3.27
Stanldad effcincy  rm  -0.27  -8.65  3.54  -394.74  -3.75  22.55
Producer  ncome  withDot stbation  pogmn  2529  1.04  148.73  125.04  2.15  4.00
Ptoducer income with stablization  prga  25.56  1.05  148.73  124.29  2.07  3.56
Sample  10
Consumet  welfae change  -0.29  -25.49  19.08  -2155.42  -0.47  3.13
Poducer welfre  change, exdusive of risk benefit  0.05  -16.41  12.06  4715.44  -2.09  23.87
Goverment wrelfare  change, wivtu  hedgg  0.00  -18.94  16A3  99999.00  -0.27  3.65
Govemment  welfae  change, with hedging  -0.04  -14.03  16.43  -10888.66  0.69  2.68
Standad  efficiency loss  -0.24  -6.16  6.99  -380.91  -1.25  18.64
Producer  income without stabilization  program  19.91  2.57  175.82  134.34  3.61  13.34
Producer  Incom  with sablzatIon  program  19.98  2.68  164.28  132.41  3.43  11.86
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Table 3: Exporter case - summary  statistics on simulation  price variables.
SAIPlO  Mean  SWd  Dev  Mldb rm  ma3lnfm  S C.V.
Sample  I
World price  35639  74353  0.89  358ass  208.63
Log of er  anm  0.01  0.10  4.25  0.27  690.78
Domerdc pmeialing  prIce  351A2  738.41  0.89  307459  21012
Expected  worid  price  355.18  745.66  0.89  3598.83  209.94
Expected  domestic  prIce  352.22  741.83  0.89  324.15  210.62
Sample  2
World price  0.61  0.43  0.07  .55  70.47
Log of enr-trnm  .0.01  0.10  .0.30  0.29  -196831
Domestic  prevailing  price  0.61  042  0.07  2.40  09.24
Expected  world  price  0.62  0.43  0.07  2.56  70.21
Expected  domestic  price  0.62  0.43  0.07  2.43  69.39
Sample  3
World pice  2.45  2.6  0.33  14.99  10632
Log of error-term  0.00  0.10  Q30  0.26  1979.93
Domestic  prevailng price  2.40  2.47  0.33  14.43  103.28
Exped wold  pOce  144  2.9  0.33  15.06  10606
Expected  domestir  price  2.41  2.52  Q33  15.03  104.35
Sarmple  4
Wotdd  price  4.78  2.79  0.57  13.11  58.39
Log of error-term  0.00  0.10  .0.28  Q28  3755.64
Domesti prevailng prke  4.73  2.72  0.58  1249  s7.55
Expected  world  pdice  4.80  2.81  0.57  13.17  58.56
Expected  domestfc  price  4.76  2.76  0.57  12.ss  58.03
Sample  5
Wtodd  price  7.50  3.85  .98  19.37  51.36
Log of  eror-tenr  0.00  0.10  40.32  0.28  3361.79
Domestic  prevailUn  price  7.47  3.80  1.04  19.37  50.90
Expected  world  price  7.53  3.88  0.99  19.47  31.53
Expected  domestc  price  7.50  3.84  1.01  19.47  51.20
Sample  6
World prie  0.42  0.51  0.01  1.88  122.31
Log of  ter-tern  .0.01  0.10  -0.34  0.34  .1329.12
Domestc  prevailing  prie  0.42  0.51  0.01  1.79  120.0
Expected  word price  0.42  o.51  0.01  1.89  121.82
Expectd domestic  price  0.42  0.51  0.01  1.87  121.0
Sample 7
Wodd prie  0.10  016  o.oo  1.04  16SA0
Log of eror-tm  .0.01  0.10  .0.31  0.24  .685.34
Domestic  pravailng price  10  0.17  0.00  1.04  16943
Expected  world  price  0.10  017  0.00  1.05  169.87
Expected  domestic  price  010  017  mo0  1.05  17050
sample  8
World price  3.  10  2.68  0.68  15.9  8648
Log of  error-term  0.00  0.11  .(.33  0.28  16711.74
Domestic  ptevailing  prce  3.07  2.60  0.71  15.42  84.64
Expected  world  prie  3.12  2.70  0.68  15.67  8.51
Expctd  domestic  prie  3.09  2.64  0.68  15.49  S5.26
Sample  9
Wodd price  22.81  23.91  1.01  107.6  104I
Log of enor-tm  0.01  0.10  40.30  0.33  118468
Domestic  prevailing prie  22.45  23.40  1.01  104.50  104.20
Expected  world price  22.78  23.94  1.01  108.20  105.09
Expected domadsc price  22.55  24.60  1.01  107.11  104.67
Sample  10
Wodld  prie  0.45  0.58  0.05  2.68  126.95
Log of eor-tem  0.00  0.10  40.30  0.32  *2621.64
Domestic prevailing  prie  0.46  0.57  0.06  2.63  12530
Expected  worrM  price  0.46  0.58  0.05  2.70  126.56
Expeted  domestic price  0.46  0.57  0.06  2.64  125.39
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Table 4: Exporter case -producer  income, and changes in producer,  consumer,  and govenmment  we.fare.
Sample  Mean  Minimum  Maimtum  % CV  Skwsea  Kurtre3
Sample I
Consumer welfare change  -. 105  -37.54  26.90  -682.81  -1.24  5.34
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  2.85  -103.97  247.45  1149.43  2.76  18.08
Government welfare change, without hedging  -2.92  -268.91  121.02  -1231.45  -2.89  19.61
Govemnment  welfare change, with hedging  -0.10  -260.60  121.02  -30968.31  -3.08  27.36
Standard efficiency loss  -1.12  -74.20  45.49  -984.96  -1.87  12.64
Producer Income without stabilization program  426.46  22.05  1637.03  74.89  0.73  0.01
Producer income with stabilization  430.73  23.63  1610.87  73.79  0.67  -0.19
Sample 2
Consumer welfare change  0.62  -70.04  43.31  1753.72  -0.89  8.20
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -73.04  -10031.71  6308.93  -1559.36  -0.96  20.99
Government  welfare change, without hedging  70.84  -7969.58  12086.44  1972.33  0.43  21.11
Govemnment  welfare cbange, with hedging  149.25  -7709.63  12086.44  838.30  1.60  27.29
Standard efficiency loss  -1.59  -2263.03  2280.62  -21886.25  -0.94  1795
Producer income without stabilization program  10159.25  238.34  56482.20  118.29  1.40  1.39
Producer income with stabilization  10049.69  267.40  53130.25  116.78  1.30  0.85
Samnple  3
Consumet welfare change  -0.06  -3022  39.87  -13470.45  0.40  4.39
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -1.93  -728.12  1041.31  -6558.21  2.29  29.65
Government  welfare change, without hedging  0.54  -1255.18  1057.07  29085.34  -2.06  33.76
Government welfare change, with hedging  8.39  -1130.87  1057.07  1656.43  40.70  33.89
Standard efficiency loss  -1.45  -404.25  345.57  -3020.99  -0.18  35.36
Producet incomne  without stabilization pzogram  1095.49  127.34  11014.94  131.94  3.85  1726
Producer incotne with stabilization  1092.59  137.66  10349.14  130.74  3.71  15.71
Sample 4
Consumer welfare change  0.50  -45,99  59.45  2521.03  0.48  4.01
Producer  welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -173.86  -19857.04  7364.79  -1186.66  -3.40  27.31
Government  welfare change, without hedging  157.41  -11006.02  22910.23  1551.78  2.66  2526
Government welfare change, with hedging  311.16  -5933.24  22908.96  702.14  4.54  35.13
Standard efficiency loss  -15.94  -3687.22  3349.89  -3671.08  -0.49  17.19
Producer income without stabilization program  17812.26  816.62  87683.69  91.44  1.13  1.01
Producer income with stabization  17551.48  856.95  71285.44  88.80  0.94  0.06
Sample 5
Consumer welfare change  -0.40  -29.12  29.30  -1732.98  -0.11  3.71
Producer welfare change, exdusive of risk benefit  0.75  -428.25  337.86  5868.89  -0.88  3897
Government welfare change, without hedging  -1.26  -421.31  499.87  -3917.62  0.44  43.84
Government  welfare change, with hedging  1.05  -354.59  499.86  4247.18  1.96  54.45
Standard efficiency loss  -0.92  -112.58  98.17  -1390.04  -1.13  28.83
Producer income  witbout atabilization program  281.29  5.19  2737.81  161.83  2.75  8.36
Produoer inconme  with stablzation  282.41  5.83  2606.75  158.85  2.S9  7.00
Sample 6
Consumer  welfare change  -0.58  -25.38  25.47  -969.13  -0.66  4.75
Producer welfare change, exdusive  of risk benefit  -0.37  -276.82  166.74  -7642.11  -3.02  34.27
Government  welfare change, without hedgg  0.41  -204.33  388.45  8095.34  4.12  53.27
(Government  welfare change. with hedging  2.20  -161.09  388.45  1367.50  5.99  71.09
Standard efficiency loa9  -0.55  -60.59  135.82  -2025.50  4.27  58.67
Producer  income without stabilizRtion  program  343.91  24.39  2746.40  152.43  2.59  6.19
Producer  incorne with stabilization  343.35  27.19  2484.72  149.67  2.51  5.72
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Table 4: Exporter case - producer  income, and changes  in producer,  consumer  and government  welfare
(continued.)
8samle  Mean  minimum  aximum  % CV  Skewnes  Kturolo
Saiple  7
Consumer welfare change  0.19  -34.93  40.96  4761.71  0.43  4.00
Prducer  welfae  change, exclusive of risk benfit  -15.30  -1734.57  1530.74  -1594.75  -!.25  17.27
Governent  welfue  change, withot  hedging  13.22  -1934.72  2111.88  2274.84  1.17  18.38
tovenmunt  welfae  change, with hedging  32.75  -1533.18  2111.86  825.50  2.49  22.51
Standard effciency  loss  -1.88  -424.58  414.06  -4228.72  0.63  15.19
Producer income without stilizat  program  2590.90  230.74  20717.94  131.39  2.55  6.91
Producer inobme with stabilizadon  2567.95  234.79  19138.73  129.79  2.46  6.26
Sample 8
Consurer  welfare change  -0.08  -29.45  28.47  -8474.01  -0.33  3.75
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -3.12  -471.54  183.6G  -1782.32  -2.32  18.66
Govermnent welfare change, without hedging  2.52  -253.94  519.61  2488.39  2.03  18.00
Governmnt  welfare change, with hedging  7.54  -175.37  519.61  736.07  3.56  26.50
Standard efficency  loss  -0.68  -101.39  110.47  -2628.46  40.29  9.91
Producer income without stabilizaton  program  774.78  !56.39  3172.62  66.97  1.42  2.17
Producer Income with stabilization  770.10  156.39  2649.53  6! 17  1.32  1.61
Sample 9
Consumef welfare change  1.17  -51.94  39.88  857.01  -0.02  3.45
Producer welfare change, exdusive of risk benefit  -172.30  -19794.57  6865.05  .702.95  -9.17  145.52
Government welfare change, witout  hedging  188.86  -10280.62  25211.99  827.66  9.04  144.18
Government welfare change, with hedging  247.13  -3670.27  25211.99  593.02  11.63  180.26
Standard efficiency loss  17.72  -5523.76  5456.61  2820.39  0.75  73.05
Prodtucer  Income without stabilization program  13358.01  547.77  140765.67  166.96  3.09  10.44
Producer inome  with stabiliizaton  13099.56  686.10  129189.81  166.25  3.04  9.84
Sanple  10
Consumer welfare cbange  1.65  -40.77  48.83  714.82  0.47  2.91
Producer welfare change, exdusive of risk benefit  -418.39  -31194.66  28785.50  -875.09  -1.96  32.53
Govenonent welfare change, wiout  hedging  480.49  -37243.66  37628.99  935.07  1.45  31.87
Government welfae  change. with hedging  643.13  -31908.77  37628.57  643.75  2.88  35.54
Standard efficiency loss  63.75  -8498.79  12081.40  1927.27  2.29  35.47
Producer income without stabilization program  34118.45  451.85  278736.66  171.84  2.21  3.97
Producer income with stabilization  33490.87  487.53  260537.65  171.51  2 17  3.62
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Table 5: Importer case - summary  statistics on simulation  price variables.
bayb  Man  BMd  DOW  Mlzdemm  Mainin  *  C.V.
Sempl  I
LoS  of  e,ecr.m  0.00  0.10  .0.31  0.30  294413
Wwtd ple  4.35  4.11  0.84  21.96  94.41
Domtic  pevaBlng Fpee  431  402  0.89  IS."t  93.2
Expettd wold price  4.37  0.85  22.07  94.66
Expected dmd  pete  4.33  4.06  086  20.1U  93.72
Sample  2
Log of Onw4ar.t  400  0.10  40.27  037  464642
Wold  Price  1.15  0.76  029  3.64  66.0
Dowetib pevdYaS  pie  1.15  0.74  0.30  3.11  64.78
Expee  wd  prce  1.16  076  0.29  3.66  65.94
Expectd dramatic  prIc  1.16  0.75  0.30  3.33  65.15
Sample  3
Leg of enor-em  0.00  0.10  40.28  0.38  5735.61
Wtod  pke  2.77  1.S5  0.0  8.69  55.93
Dous_c  pavaing  prie  2.75  1.50  0.50  836  5450
xpected  WOd ple  2.78  1.56  0.51  3.73  5606
Expeted dmeaes  prIe  2.76  1.53  0.51  8.72  55.27
Sample  4
L  of  enm  400  0.10  .0.27  034  *4038.67
Wltod pice  0.4  0.22  0.20  1.28  41.12
Damesticr  prevailingp-  0.53  0.22  024  1.23  40.27
Bpeed  world pdil  0.54  0.22  0.20  1.29  41.22
Expcted dunetic  pie  0.54  022  023  1.26  40.69
S-pb  5
L,g  of enwm*rm  4000  0.10  .0.38  025  -3011.23
Weld  pile  1.22  0.78  0.16  3.79  63.67
Domeic  prvailing  prie  1.22  076  017  3A7  62.44
Bxpeedwcldpilep  1.23  073  016  3.81  63.43
Expectedadmesc  pie  1.22  0.77  0.16  3.60  62.77
Sampe 6
Log of ea-rm  000  0.10  031  0.30  2947.89
WeoM  pri.e  1.60  1.96  Q21  8.33  122.5
Do-etc  pvielig  pte  1.58  1.94  0.22  7M  122192
Expeeted wold piee  1.60  1.97  0.21  8.33  123.21
BEpeted domeetlc pile  1t59  1.96  0.22  7.92  123.24
Sample 7
LOg  of enwotenn  0.01  0.10  40.26  0.35  6756
Wold  pe  173.90  351.31  0.2  1452.39  202.02
Do_etk  prevailng prie  169.87  344.70  0.26  1373.51  202.92
Expected  weld  pilee  172.13  349.30  m2  1459.67  20298
Expectd  domestdc  price  169.60  344.75  026  1394.71  203.27
Samples
L°g of aer-teM  -Q00  0.10  4.37  0.26  -31288A3
Weld preie  1.22  0.64  0.29  3.26  52.26
Domeedc prevailIg  ice  1.21  0.62  Q33  3.08  51.34
Expected wed  pfee  1.22  0.64  0.30  3.27  5223
Expetd  doesic  piFe  1.22  0.63  0.32  3.19  51.73
Sample  9
Log of  MrM-term  0.00  ll  4036  0.32  2973.01
Weld  pice  2.25  1.59  028  6.64  7057
Dom-tc  prevailing pprke  2.22  1.56  0.28  6.38  70.04
xtpecd  wrdd  prIce  2.25  1.59  0.28  6.67  70.55
Expet  domestic prie  2.23  1.57  0.28  6.51  70.33
Sample 10
log  of er-enm  0.00  0.09  .0.28  0.30  4293.05
Weld  prIe  0.67  0.87  0.05  4.45  13024
Dostc  pvalllig  prlee  0.66  0.85  0.05  4.26  128.62
Expected  weld  prie  0.67  0.87  0.05  4.47  130.11
Expected  dometic  price  0.66  0.86  0.0e  4.44  12929
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Table 6: Importer  Case -producer  income, and changes  in producer,  consumer,  and government  welfare.
Sample  M¢aC  Minmum  aimum  % CV  Skewness  Kurt
Samnple  I
Consumer welfare change  9.82  -367.15  561.71  1075.72  0.66  4.08
Producer welfare change. exclusive of risk benefit  -12.23  -1390.69  444.43  -1245.32  -4.15  31.75
Governnent  welfare change, without hedging  -1.50  -421.39  1128.23  -8369.79  3.63  30.63
Government welfare change, with hedging  5.16  -277.57  1128.23  2201.93  5.42  44.75
Standard efftciency loss  -3.91  -257.35  299.25  -1153.46  0.10  16.28
Producer incomne  without stabilization program  1173.08  79.35  9928.83  142.40  2.34  5.68
Producer incone  with stabilization program  1154.74  85.29  8294.76  139.91  2.22  4.80
Sample 2
Consurmer  welfare change  -2.07  -470.01  313.04  4204.89  -0.62  5.39
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -0.61  -97.41  93.77  -2199.22  40.49  22.84
Government welfare change, without hedging  -0.39  -289.02  292.10  -18714.25  -0.09  3.74
Government welfare change, with hedging  -1.32  -248.30  292.10  4488.89  0.64  3.20
Standard efficiency loss  -3.07  -89.62  12.91  -283.64  -5.04  35AI
Producer incote  without stabilization program  142.97  15.93  660.30  96.53  1.34  0.89
Producer income with sabilization program  142.06  16.28  549.17  94.66  1.24  0.33
Sample 3
Consumer welfare change  2.74  -469.05  474.52  4078.44  0.04  3.40
Producer welfare change, exclusive of riak benefit  -3.39  -331.77  337.00  -1709.21  -0.81  13.53
Government welfare change, without hedginS  -3.88  -338.79  236.63  -1638.97  -0.91  5.46
Goverrnent  welfare change, with hedging  -3.49  -262.54  236.63  -1606.76  0.12  3.49
Standard efficiency loss  -4.53  -127.36  6541  -399.25  -2.71  1499
Producer incore  without stabiization  program  510.16  36.48  2563.80  86.96  1.96  4.07
Producer incone  with stabilization program  505.08  36.48  2469.20  84.77  1.86  3.60
Sample 4
Consumer welfare change  -0.92  -238.48  242.17  -6726.64  0.08  2.54
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -0.09  -14.19  9.58  -2861.11  -0.80  6.90
Government welfare change, without hedging  -0.79  -258.37  204.92  -7540.93  *0.46  2.80
Government welfare change, with hedging  -0.62  -172.64  204.92  -8564.85  0.49  1.65
Standard efficiency loss  -1.81  -26.82  0.91  -211.28  -3.26  13.05
Producer incomn without stabilization program  41.60  10.07  143.17  64.28  1.60  2.11
Producer income with stabilization program  41.46  11.63  135.92  63.29  1.55  1.75
Sample 5
Consuwmer  welfare change  -4.03  -267.10  282.71  -1806.58  0.03  2.66
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -0.61  -69.74  67.63  -2019.56  -0.93  12.21
Government welfare change, without hedging  2.52  -245.00  189.90  2411.53  -0.22  2.62
Government welfare change, with hedging  2.03  -163.96  189.90  2724.87  0.64  1.47
Standard efficiency loss  -2.12  -47.15  14.76  -266.99  -2.73  11.95
Producer income without stabilization program  154.32  6.33  666.66  91.19  1.35  126
Producer inoonm with stabiization pmgram  153.41  6.74  613.76  89.83  1.31  1.07
Sample 6
Consumer welfare change  7.88  -376.98  369.53  1058.58  0.33  3.71
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -2.52  -218.96  282.65  -1336.71  0.47  2795
Government welfare change, without hedging  -7.92  -320.77  223.58  -846.19  -1.05  4A4°
Government welfare change, with hedging  -5.53  -207.80  223.58  -1008.41  0.14  3.13
Standard efficiency loss  -2.57  -119.05  92.97  -472.25  -2.08  30.39
Producer income without stabilization program  300.47  10.45  2221.47  164.70  1.82  2.27
Producer income with stabilization program  296.69  II.0(  2078.16  164.71  1.79  2.03
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Table 6: Importer case - producer income, and changes in producer, consumer and government  welfare
(continued.)
Sample  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  % CV  skevwnen  Kurteel
Sample 7
Consurmer  welfare change  43.69  -564.84  1239.40  403.55  241  13.00
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -8668.51  -704522.54  389859.57  -858.97  -4.49  40.57
Government welfare change, without hedging  9304.13  -538014.60  794703.87  975.17  4.04  38.13
Government welfare change. with hedging  11605.00  -401003.66  794703.87  722.10  5.99  47.50
Standard efficiency loss  679.32  -179546.54  265109.14  3735.27  2.19  46.68
Producer incone  without stabilization program  489856.07  12.66  5336175.56  239.36  2.43  4.53
Producer income with'stabilizatlon program  476853.31  13.20  5129486.15  240.43  2.42  4.32
Sample 8
Consumter  welfare change  -0.84  -277.78  326.98  -9015.14  0.04  3.43
Producer welfate change, exclusive of risk benefit  *0.36  -73.67  47.23  -2842.60  -1.47  14.76
Government welfare change, without hedging  -1.13  -292.64  207.32  -5839.17  -0.46  3.73
Government welfare change, with hedging  -1.70  -186.39  207.32  -3491.05  0.54  2.36
Standard efflciency loss  -2.33  -41.60  13.36  -271.09  -2.69  9.11
Producer income without sabIlization prgram  147.43  16.24  537.04  76.72  1.22  1.17
Producer income with stabilization program  146.89  18.82  513.77  75.9  1.17  0.96
Sample 9
Consumer welfare change  9.84  -370.93  484.66  1016.77  0.70  4.68
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -4.25  -168.91  127.90  -681.70  -1.53  9.45
Government welfare change, without hedging  -9.07  460.74  269.40  -872.79  -1.64  7.48
Government we!ftre change, with hedging  -7.01  -282.58  269-40  -926.28  40.23  3.99
Standard efficiency loss  -3.48  82.95  58.28  -357.72  -2.33  12.03
Producer incone  without stabilization program  398.89  15.11  1701.62  95.05  1.05  0.54
Producer income with stabilization pogam  392.51  15.11  1557.42  94.45  1.02  0.43
Sample 10
Consumnr welfare change  5.30  -216.14  444.15  1246.61  1.05  6.64
Producer welfare change. exclusive of risk benefit  -1.54  -146.43  21.24  -709.91  -8.87  9726
Government welfare change. without hedging  -5.66  -348.76  189.58  -1073.04  -0.95  4.66
Government welfare change, with hedging  -4.98  -213.15  189.58  -1054.75  0.19  228
Standard efficiency loss  -1.90  -51.04  21.07  -261.97  -3.84  26.35
Producer incore  without stabilization program  82.73  1.30  934.41  195.36  3.08  9.75
Producer incore  with stabilization program  8041  1.36  891.09  194.27  3.12  10.12
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Table 7: Wide band case - swumamy  stadstics  on simulation  price variables.
0811b  Mean  Std  DeM  MdnUmn  Malnm  C.V.
Sample I
L°8 of er-Wm  0.00  0.10  40.2S  0.34  3021.86
Wedd prie  7A3  5.16  0.77  2240  69.44
Domestc pfvailing  price  7.42  5.14  0.80  22.40  69.25
Bxpectd wod  pcoe  7A6  5.19  0.78  22.52  69.62
Expectd dorndc  price  7.46  5.19  0.78  22.52  69.60
Sample 2
Log of error-term  4.00  0.10  .0.33  0.32  -28236.99
Wetd  price  4.53  4.14  0.80  18.69  9133
Dotic  pvailng  pie  4.51  4.11  0.81  17.66  91.23
Pected  Wd  pice  4.55  4.16  0.81  18.78  91.32
Expocted destic  price  4.55  4.15  0.81  18.78  91.34
Sample 3
Log of emor-m  0,01  0.10  .0.26  0.34  1739.47
Wodd pice  11.86  6.88  0.96  39.37  57.97
Dmetic  prevaling pri  11.78  6.76  0.96  38.05  57.37
Bxpete dwold  pue  11.89  6.92  0.97  39.57  5.24
Expetd  dometic  pil  11.86  6.89  0.97  38.24  58.07
Sample 4
Log oofemrgwm  40.00  0.10  .0.34  o.2  68173.10
Wend price  0.70  Q34  0.16  2.49  48.58
Doec  prevailitg  prie  0.70  0.33  0.16  2.17  47.78
Expected would  price  0.71  0.34  0.16  2.50  48.8
Expected doaee  price  0.71  0.34  0.16  2.38  48.40
Sample S
Lo  of aew-trm  0.01  0.10  .0.30  0.31  1153.70
Wold  pice  15.89  21.05  0.80  116.13  132.53
Domestic prevailg  pi-e  15.79  20.86  0.80  107.29  132.12
Expected would priee  15.81  20.99  0.80  116.72  132.75
Expetedde  -mede pice  15.79  20.93  0.80  114.62  132.58
Sample 6
Log of enror-m  .0.00  0.10  40.28  0.28  -118642A
Wndt
4 prie  1.82  1.41  0.37  8.13  77.52
D_mcstc prevdHng price  1.81  1.39  0.40  7.34  76.92
Expeced woad pdre  1.83  1.42  Q38  8.17  77.46
Expected domestic pdre  1.83  IAI  0.38  7.92  77.30
Sample 7
Log of enor-term  0.00  0.10  40.31  0.24  2643.63
Wedd price  2.13  2.54  0.30  10.77  118.99
Dometc  Prevailing  Fde  2.12  2.S2  0.31  1Q64  118.82
EXpeOd Wv dprle  2.13  2.54  0.31  10.83  119.26
Expccted donesdcprice  2.13  2.54  0.31  10.83  119.27
Sample 8
Log of  ar-tem  0.00  0.10  .0.31  0.27  9486.80
Would price  1.06  0.45  0.31  2.77  42.48
Domestic prevsiing prie  1.05  0.44  Q31  2.77  41.75
Expecd  woeld prie  1.06  0.45  0.32  2.79  42.46
Expected domesic price  1.06  0.45  0.32  2.79  42.15
Sample 9
Log of  uor-tsm  0.00  0.10  .0.28  0.33  2629.23
Wodd prie  2.28  1.60  0.76  8.79  70.39
Domsidc prevailing prie  2.27  1.59  0.76  8.29  70.06
Expected world price  2.28  1.60  0.76  8.83  70.29
Expected domesdc prie  2.28  1.60  0.76  8.42  70.08
Sample 10
Log of enrr-tem  0.00  0.10  .0.29  0.33  6927.83
World price  1.07  1.08  0.12  4.25  101.12
Domeatic pevailing price  1.07  1.07  0.12  4.20  100.87
Expected world price  1.07  1.09  0.12  4.28  101.24
Expected domesde prIce  1.07  1.08  0.12  4.28  101.26
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Table 8: Wide band Case - producer income, and changes in producer, consumer, and govemment
welfare.
sample  Metn  Miimum  Maximum  % CV  Skewnm  Kurt"
Sampbe I
Consumr  welfare chwage  0.32  -31.44  34.76  1873.06  0.19  13.06
Producer welfare change, without hedging  -2.75  -737.50  411.57  -2928.31  -1.77  27.22
Govemment welfare change, witbout hedging  3.01  -592.26  951.95  3484.88  1.54  26.92
Government welfare change, with hedging  9.18  -366.95  951.95  961.31  4.68  42.03
Standard efficency  toss  0.57  -207.48  249.21  5699.90  0.88  24.26
Producer Inome  without stabflization pzogmam  2392.68  71.02  10004.20  92.47  0.94  0.25
Producer income with stabilization pgrom  2388.55  74.01  10004.20  92.15  0.92  0.21
Sample 2
Consmer  welfae  change  0.45  -22.37  36.31  1007.90  2.30  18.96
Producer welfam char  ), without bedging  -4.47  -295.87  167.49  -859.68  -4.27  29.59
Govemnmt  welfare change, withwut  bedging  5.28  -230.20  426.40  942.29  4.61  36.32
Govemnent  welfae  change, with hedging  7.05  -118.07  426.40  656.75  6.25  45.76
Stadard  efficiency lo5  1.27  -85.08  147.25  1279.43  4.50  40.08
Producer income without stabnization program  1237.96  75.51  7759.41  130.68  1.77  2.57
Producer incone  with stablization  program  1231.26  75.79  7331.43  130.74  1.77  2.54
Sample 3
roauir welfaze change  0.80  -25.38  35.79  679.74  2.01  14.88
Producer welfare change, without hedging  -24.13  -2240.97  686.47  -713.68  -6.11  66.74
Governent  welfare change, without hedging  30-54  -1012.04  3292.61  799.66  6.60  76.08
Government welfare change, with hedging  38.19  -495.57  3292.61  598.73  8.51  96.29
Standard efficiency loss  7.20  -381.61  1083.95  1154.83  5.70  68.16
Producer income without stabilization prgam  4581.33  96.20  23159.69  85.54  1.89  4.80
Producer income wlth stabilization program  4545.13  96.20  22587.27  84.68  1.83  4.52
Salmpl 4
Consumer welfare change  0.25  -12.72  20.60  986.85  2.67  2t.70
Producer welfare change, without hedging  -0.24  -30.31  4.92  -784.49  -10.02  135.45
Govemnment  welfare change, without hedging  0.05  -16.42  28.52  3972.02  4.26  101.19
Government welfare change, with hedging  0.03  -9.32  28.52  6942.31  6.95  115.53
Standard efftciency toso  0.06  -5.17  14.25  1581.40  9.42  150.60
Producer h=me  without stabilization progrnm  63.93  6.72  358.85  75.46  2.29  8.03
Producer inoote  with stabilizaton  program  63.56  6.74  315.63  74.12  2.15  6.98
Sample 5
Consumer welfare change  0.84  -34.14  33.98  691.37  0.53  12.42
Producer welfame  change, without hedging  -48.47  -7750.55  1546.08  -970.86  -11.94  169.34
Govenment  welfare change. without hedging  62.15  -2311.94  11597.60  1086.47  12.85  195.18
Government welfare change, with hedging  69.76  -921.71  11597.60  951.44  13.59  208.22
Standard efficiency los  14.51  -773.13  3874.10  1557.70  12.49  194.25
Producer income without stabilization progrm  9689.23  73.91  116025.40  192.29  2.79  8.17
Producer income with stabilization program  9616.52  73.91  114863.83  191.50  2.74  7.67
Sample 6
Consuer  welfare change  0.37  -21.21  28.29  976.57  1.63  18.24
Producer welfare change, without hedging  -1.65  -151.13  18.26  -671.35  -8.85  97.78
Government welfare change, without hedging  1.74  -20.09  208.76  778.28  10.68  136.47
Government welfare change, with hedging  1.79  -15.69  208.76  755.27  10.80  138.42
Standard effciency  los  0.46  -24.04  74.76  1125.57  8.21  102.61
Producer income without stabilization program  295.51  24.81  2105.47  121.47  2.23  4.92
Producer income with stabilization program  293.04  26.47  2066.58  120.86  2.20  4.66
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Table  8: Wide band case - producer income, and changes in producer, consumer and government welifre
(continued.)
Sample  Mean  Mi  tnm Maxinum  % CV  8Sewme  KIrtoais
Sample 7
Consumet welfare change  0.38  -20.03  22.86  895.62  134  19.19
Eproducer  welfare change, without hedging  -1.64  *153.45  92.38  -874.96  *6.93  70.04
Government welfare change, without hedging  1.76  -128.55  214.18  1066.13  7.26  79.99
Glovenmuent  welfare change, with hedging  2.08  -6.98  214.18  850.91  9.47  95.35
Standard efficiency loss  0.51  -46.47  76.09  1284.77  7.23  85.79
Producer income without stabWlization  program  449.91  17.22  3500.25  169.22  2.07  327
Producer Income with stabilization program  447.46  17.22  3500.25  169.10  2.07  3.26
Sample 8
Consumer welfate change  0.35  -28.83  26.28  1284.63  0.71  16.59
Producer welfare change. without hedging  -0.60  -33.98  21.85  -739.90  -3.83  26.88
Govermuent welfare change, without hedging  0.31  -9.66  3145  790.83  5.23  64.23
Government welfare change, with hedging  0.35  -6.71  31.45  673.23  7.07  72.41
Standard efficiency loss  0.06  -11.72  15.66  2942.58  141  25.99
Producer income without stabilization piogram  115.88  19.17  429.80  64.40  1.53  2.8
Producer income with dabilization program  114.98  19.17  429.80  63.73  156  3.10
Sample 9
Consuner welfare change  0.33  -34.36  20.10  1356.88  -IA9  20.32
Producer welfare change, without hedging  -1.14  -;82.0(7  109.56  -1348.34  -3.51  62.39
Government welfare change, without hedging  1.10  -149.37  251.90  168145  5.96  102.76
Government welfare change, with hedging  1.63  -74.79  251.90  1009.55  10.28  143.64
Standard efficiency loss  0.29  -55A4S  89.93  245037  421  82.17
Producer income without stabilization program  399.43  70.99  2490.55  113.65  2.32  5.12
Prducer  incone  with stabilization program  397.72  70.99  238723  113.14  .28  4.87
Sample 10
Consumer welfare change  0.32  -12.33  20.51  953.50  2.00  13A0
Producer welfare change, without hedging  -0.38  -44.10  2926  -1203.05  -S.03  51.28
Government welfare change, without hedging  0.14  -34.21  52.74  3965.-1  4.04  44.73
Govenment  welfare change, with hedging  0.30  -19.94  52.74  1607.76  6.6S  61.63
Standard efficiency los  0.07  -14.94  21.52  2652.96  4.94  66.40
Producer incoe  without sblizatin  program  148.84  4.4S  849.74  139.41  1.64  1.63
Producer income with stabization  progrm  148.26  4.45  849.74  139.05  1.62  1.56
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Table  9: Upward drift case - summary statistics on simulation price variables.
Sampl,  Mean  Std Dew  Mlnmm  Mallm  %  C.V.
Sample I
Log of error-temn  .0.00  0.10  .0.34  0.29  -3450.45
Worid price  53.89  51.07  1.06  203.84  9476
domestic  prevaiing price  53.09  50.03  1.06  190.90  94.24
Expected  world price  54.07  51.23  1.01  20536  94.75
Expected  domestic  price  53.50  50.58  1.01  196.88  94A53
Sample  2
Log of error-terma  0.01  0.10  .0.30  0.30  993.58
Wordd  price  229.05  295.41  1.06  154&24  12897
domestic prevailing price  224.65  287.38  1.06  149Q64  127.92
Expected  world price  227.45  291.70  1.01  155650  128.25
Expected domestic pnce  225.o0  287.66  1.01  1476.75  127.80
Sa,mple  3
Log of error-erm  40.00  0.10  .0.33  0.30  .3459.94
Worid pdce  22.49  13.70  1.03  78.58  oQ92
domesdc  prevailing  price  22.18  13.17  1.03  77.35  59A.
Expected worid price  22.70  13.70  1.01  79.47  60.34
Expected domestic price  22.44  13.37  1.01  77.03  S9.59
Sanple  4
Log of error-term  0.01  0.10  .0.27  0.31  98534
Wotld price  263.76  40&68  0.93  2480.72  1594
dotmesdc  prevaiUng  price  255A0  386.55  0.94  2288.12  15135
Expected wortd price  260.35  398.68  0.94  .36612  153.13
Expected domestic price  256.02  387.42  0.94  228812  15132
saple  5
Log of error-term  0.00  0.09  *0.26  0.29  5329.99
World price  69.04  65.21  1.08  226.73  9445
domtic  pevailing pdrc  68.33  64.33  1.08  216.21  94.15
Expected wodd price  69.43  65.71  1.01  228i34  94164
Expected domestic price  68.87  65.08  1.01  225.59  94A9
Sample  6
Log of error-term  0.00  0.10  .031  .26  205632
World pre  112.57  157.28  1.02  72354  139.72
domestic prevaing price  110.88  1554  1.06  723.54  13937
Expected word  price  11236  157.25  1.01  727.65  13995i
Expected dometic  pice  111.26  155.49  1.01  727.65  139.76
Sample  7
LOS  of erro-term  0.01  0.10  4.32  0.27  830.23
World prie  306.18  298.26  0.78  134449  97.41
domestic prevaUng priee  300.90  290,73  0.85  1315.89  96.62
Expected world price  305.27  29653  0.79  133695  97.14
Expected domestic price  301.88  291.73  0.85  1314.09  9664
Sample 8
Log of error-term  0.00  0.10  .0.28  0.32  3467.66
Wodd price  81.61  70.10  0.79  274.55  85.90
domestic prevalUng pdce  80.87  69.50  0.87  262.96  85.94
Expected world price  82.02  7Q64  0.81  276.34  86.13
Expected domestic price  81.44  70.16  .88  271.73  86.15
Sample 9
Log of errr-term  0.00  0.10  4.34  Q30  302495
Word priee  62.11  42.55  1.25  224.81  68.50
domestic prevaiUng  price  61.40  41.69  1.10  21397  67.90
Expected world price  62.48  42.93  1.01  226.30  68.71
Expected domestic price  61.90  42.26  1.01  215A0  68.28
Sample  10
Log of error-term  0.00  0.10  4.29  0.31  5975.75
Wodd price  91.30  80.51  0.64  321.12  88.18
domestic prevailing  price  90.76  79.88  0.6S  298.94  88.02
Expected world price  91.75  81.11  0.65  323.15  88.40
L.pected domestic price  91.36  80.74  0.67  30836  88.38
xiiiAnnex 1: Simulation  results for key variables
Table 10: Utpward  drift Case - producer income, and changes in producer,  consumer,  and government
welfare.
Sample  Mean  Minimum  Maximumn  % CV  Skewnsns  Kurtees
Sample I
Consumer welfate change  2.91  -72.63  57.70  549.00  0.01  3.21
Producer welfire change, exdusive of risk benefit  -709.33  -29359.30  13829.43  -568.46  -2.26  12.78
Govemnment  welfre  change, widtout hedging  754.42  -19265.29  33442.54  667.59  2.06  12.22
Government welfare change, with hedging  1040.12  -14948.92  33442.38  442.43  3.13  15.84
Standard efficiency lowe  47.99  -7514.15  10233.77  2811.89  0.85  12.50
Producer income without stabgiation  progamn  52680.33  106.49  279370.00  121.32  1.57  2.04
Prducer  income with sabizaton  program  51616.33  106.49  259323.57  120.52  1.54  1.92
Sample 2
Consuer  welfae  change  19.31  -631.55  958.76  629.17  1.78  17.11
Producer welfire change, exdusive of risk benefit  -9032.26  .557233.00  267813.58  -599.46  -3.06  29.73
Government welfarem ange, witout  hedging  10456A7  -337959.19  706034.86  667.17  3.15  29.26
Oovernment welfare  chae,  with bedging  12892.16  -279355.26  706034.30  509.48  4.17  35.02
Stadrd  effcey  kloss  1443.51  -111211.43  149760.62  1390.f  2.13  18.25
Producer income without stabilizatt  progrm  528729.37  112.04  5831870.86  571..  2.67  8.31
Produer  ncome with ataization  ponam  515180.98  110.33  5728318.56  174.86  2.55  7.27
Sample 3
Consumer welfare cbange  2.28  -53.44  73.17  656.51  0.73  4.35
Prducer  welfae  change. exdusive of risk benefit  -177.09  -7439.64  6588.26  -687.82  -2.00  14.77
Govemnment  welfare dcnge,  witbout hedging  173.57  -8273.69  9125.34  844.61  1.82  15.20
Governmnt  welfare change, with hedging  264.81  -7328.84  9124.70  511.15  2.66  18.77
Sttdard  efficiency loss  -1.23  -1882.15  2756.27  -29688.01  1.22  14.99
Prducer  income without stabization  progrm  12159.00  103.19  67884.96  87.20  1.93  5.73
Producer Ineome with  stablation  pfogram  11893.37  103.19  67884.96  84.28  1.73  4.82
Sample 4
Conmer  welfre  change  41.76  -954.34  2435.36  556.47  4.26  33.19
Prducer  welfare cbange, exclusive of risk benefit  -23362.84 -1571033.07  548514.56  -609.94  -5.69  48.33
Govermment  welfare change, without hedging  26902.92  -752745.16  1844705.39  631.75  5,30  43.48
Government welfare change, with hedging  29946.81  -525010.16  1844704.50  551.35  5.96  47.71
Standard effciency  losw  3581.84  -205184.94  343512.10  1067.31  3.99  37.09
Producer income without stabization  program  725794.22  97.0612066912.61  220.19  3.77  16.81
Producer income with stabilization program  690749.95  98.97 10945078.73  213.22  3.54  14.61
Sample S
Consumer welfare change  2.36  -56.62  84.01  659.90  0.51  4.55
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -701.35  -59374.73  27454.08  -891.05  -2.70  22.94
Government welfare change, without hedging  701.13  -37426.38  68770.34  1096.33  2.16  20.10
Government welfare change, with hedging  1174.45  -25758.64  68770.06  589.82  3.59  27.39
Standard efficieney loss  2.15  -11784.42  10471.17  92862.70  0.34  10.61
Producer income without stabilization program  76588.79  108.64  335890.47  115.14  0.90  -0.49
Producer income with stabglization  program  75536.77  108.64  317919.14  114.57  0.87  -0.59
Sample 6
Consumer welfare change  7.46  -272.17  536.59  796.37  5.36  46.80
Produer  welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -2516.49  -229399.41  81810.88  -876.61  -6.13  52.96
Government welfare change, without hedging  2729.00  -107303.26  247812.88  958.07  5.39  46.34
Governamnt welfare change, with hedging  3674.13  -80495.96  247812.84  666.53  6.96  57.98
Standard efficiency lo  219.97  -3015943  75009.27  2774.42  4.54  63.84
Producer income without stabiization program  190869.31  107.04  1888154.12  195.47  2.71  6.99
Producer income with stabilization progran  187094.57  110.33  1888154.12  194.98  2.71  7.03
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Table 10: Upward drift  case - producer income, and changes in producer, consumer and government
welhre (continued.)
Sampe  Men  MinIum  *M  AXnM  % CV  Skewim  Kurtoab
Sabmpe  7
Cooumer  welfae  change  25.04  .55622  1067.51  601.33  2.92  16.88
Producer welare  change, exdusive of risk benefit  -11368.0  -49824.51  233310.81  -589.02  -3.62  23.03
Govrnement welfare dcange, witout  hedging  12306.76  -30S689.47  618424.67  664.74  3.28  20.51
Government welfare  change, with hedging  16114.38  -228182.86  618345.49  474.47  4.30  25.47
Stnderd  effciency  los  963.00  -105585.28  153122.81  2219.61  1.61  17.14
Producer incom  without  tabliztaoa  progmum  713222.11  72.64  472015193  130.90  1.83  3.25
Producer bncome  witD Sabilation  pognram  696168.91  78.69  4619862A1  129.65  1.80  3.17
Sample 8
Cosmmer  welfare change  293  -49.00  74.11  533.32  0.78  3.11
Poducer  welfe  change, exclusive of rbk benefit  -682.67  -45590.81  28520.01  -1019.10  -2.13  16.30
Governmetm  welfame  Cdage,  withoet hedging  676.77  -42160.05  59854.99  1290.68  1.77  16.55
Govenmnt  welfWre  change, with hedging  1268.66  .31006.28  59799.71  603.92  3.60  23.26
Standasd efficiency k1m  -2.97  -14067.76  19728.93  -42271.19  1.04  18.17
Producer bincme widhou stabDation  progium  94419.64  73.38  433914.06  107.65  1.04  0.26
Producer hincme wihb  aablizaton  proganm  93395.64  81.69  415596.24  107.60  1.03  0.23
Sampl  9
Conumner  elfaecange  3.00  -78.80  114.29  572.54  0.55  6.11
Producr  welfae  change, exdusive of risk benefit  4613.78  -58561.84  26753A7  -939.14  -2.52  27.57
Government welfade dnge,  widthu  hedging  586.35  -35218.58  73821.71  1202.15  2.30  29.45
Government welfar  change, with hedging  1016.62  -29335.09  73821.57  633.70  3.57  38.84
Staudad  effiBcny  koa  -24.43  -13280.12  15374.16  -7521.33  033  21.32
Pmducer income without  tblD  tion program  57944.38  125.75  321875.77  90A0  1.58  4.36
Producer income witb  tbization  program  57023.72  110.33  313633.34  89.01  1.47  3.94
Sapl  10
Comsumer  welfare change  2.29  -86.27  96.63  861.65  0.34  5.16
Producer welre  change, exduive  of ibk  beefit  -486.73  -64411.74  74680.70  -2146.76  0.30  18.21
Government welfae  change, witdho  hedging  423.78  -9864128  73138.79  3066.36  -0.52  17.08
Governmet  welfWe  change, with  ebdging  1429.40  -79284.72  73136.23  791.54  0.54  20.45
Stundard efficency  klm  .60.66  -27125.13  16971.28  -5559.77  -0.86  15.30
Producer income withu  stabRil-aon  piogram  113168.97  54-74  547584.81  109.41  1.14  0.70
Producer income with stab9iIzaon  p  ngram  1124338.  55.77  498559.10  108.96  1.09  0.45
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Table 11: Deterministic  model simulation  - summary  statistics  on simulation  price variables.
Sample  Mean  81d Do,  Mldlnmsss  Wlrsm  % C.V.
Sample  I
Log of eroT-term  .0.00  0,10  40.31  0.33  -671630
Worid price  1.01  0,13  065  1.46  12.85
Domestt  prevailing pTice  1.00  0.09  0.73  1.23  8.73
Bxpected world price  1.00  0.05  0.86  1.15  4.75
Expected  domestic  pdce  1.00  0.05  0.85  1.15  48S
Snmple 2
Log of eror-term  0.00  0.10  40.36  0.29  4389.88
World price  1.00  0.13  0.64  1.52  13.34
Domelstic  prevailng price  1.00  0.09  0.78  1 '0  8.83
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.85  1.17  4.90
Expected  domestic price  1.00  0.05  0.82  1.22  5.23
Sample 3
Log of error-term  .0.01  0.10  -Q29  0.26  -1740Q44
World pdce  1.02  0.13  0.70  1.54  13.07
Domestic prevailng price  1.01  0.09  0.79  1.33  8.70
Bxpected world price  1.01  0.05  0.88  1.18  4.78
Expected domestic price  1.01  0.05  0.88  1.18  4.90
Sample  4
Log of emrr-tfnm  0.00  0.10  *0.30  0.29  2383.6
World price  1.00  013  0.64  1.42  13.18
Domestic  prevsiUng  prioe  0.99  0.09  0.74  1.24  8.57
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.85  1.14  4.86
Expected  domaesdc  pice  1.00  005  0.85  1.14  4.94
Sample  S
Log of eror.ten  .0.00  0.10  40.33  0.31  4302.94
World priee  1.01  0.13  0.62  1.46  13.24
Domestic  prevailng price  1.01  0.10  0.79  1.32  9A8
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.84  1.15  4.90
Expected  domeetc  price  1.00  0.05  0.84  1.15  4.99
Sample 6
Log of err-trmn  0.01  0.10  40.28  0.27  140.42
Wodd price  .99  0.13  Q68  1.55  13.58
Domestic prevaing  prIe  0.99  0.09  0.78  1.23  871
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.87  1.18  4.99
Expected  domestic price  1.00  0.05  0.81  1.18  5.18
Sample 7
Log ot error.erm  0.01  0.10  .0.33  0.28  1064A4
Wodd price  0.99  0.13  0.67  1.50  13.40
Domestic prevailing orce  0.98  0.09  0.73  1.34  9.51
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.87  1.16  4.90
Expected  domesdc price  1.00  0.0Q  086  1.21  5.21
Sample 8
Log of error-term  0.00  0.10  *0.34  0632  53401.06
Wodd prce  1.01  0.14  0.65  1.46  13.46
Domestic pevailing pice  1.00  0.09  0.75  1.31  9.39
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.86  1.15  4.96
Expected  domestic price  1.00  0.05  0.86  1.21  5.29
Sample 9
Log of enror-tm  0.00  0.10  40.31  o.30  5292.70
World pdcr  1.00  0.14  0.63  1.51  14.07
Domestic prevailing pri2  1.00  0.09  0.78  1.30  9.33
Expected  world price  1.00  0.05  0.84  1.17  5.17
Expected  domesdc price  1.00  0.05  0.85  1.17  5.38
Sample  10
Log of error-tem  0.01  0.09  40.28  0.32  148S.45
Wod  price  .99  0.13  0.65  1.40  12.69
Domestc prevaling  price  .99  0.08  0.75  1.27  8.54
Expeced  world proe  1.00  0.05  0.85  1.14  4.68
Expected  domestic  pdce  1.00  0.05  0.85  1.14  4.79
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Table 12: Determinstic  model simutation  - Producer income, and changes in producer,  consumer, and
govenmment  welfare.
Sample  Mean  Minimun  Masmum  % CV  Skewem  Kurtodsi
Sample I
Consumer welfare change  0.01  -34.28  31.80  53122.91  0.15  5.55
Producer  welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  *0.56  -54.08  40.76  -1796.05  .1.00  6.40
Govemnment  welfare change, without hedging  0.51  -31.25  40.81  1453.38  1.08  7.09
Govemrnent welfare change,  with hedging  1.56  -15.98  40.77  382.05  3.03  12.34
Standard efficiency loss  -004  -24.77  21.38  -11690.16  .0.17  6.34
Producer  income  without stabilization program  202.16  123.99  293.42  13.79  0.23  0.10
Producer  income with stabilization program  201.32  134.54  259.51  10.12  0.05  -0.12
Sample 2
Consumet welfare change  -0.01  -34.21  37.20  -57132.73  0.34  4.36
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  *0.58  -59.61  38.04  -1818.31  -1.08  5.44
Government  welfare change, without hedging  0.55  -27.80  46.32  1415 19  1.40  6.97
Goverment welfare change, with hedging  1.68  -26.64  46.32  385.79  2.75  12.69
Standard efficiency loss  -0.05  -22.74  23.92  -10079.94  0.36  4.89
Producer income  without stabilization  program  200.53  121,81  313.76  14.42  0.43  0.73
Producer income with stabilization  program  199.65  146.78  281.30  10.55  0.52  0.81
Sample  3
Consumer  welfare change  0.03  -34.41  30.56  27778.84  0.07  4.55
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -0.43  -50.09  41.31  -2471 12  .0.65  3.23
Government welfare change,  without hedging  0.53  -30.50  40.69  1532.22  0.94  6.34
Government  welfare change, with hedging  1.50  -22.53  40.68  453.33  2.30  10.07
Standard  efficiency loss  0.13  -23.18  21.15  3907.51  0.14  5.07
Producer income without stabilization  program  204.26  134.91  322.92  14.00  0.65  1.17
Producer income with stabilization  program  203.62  149.63  277.01  10.14  0.47  0.51
Sample 4
Consumet welfafe change  40.01  -36.23  33AI  -99999.00  0.04  5.04
Producer welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -0.60  -. 4.04  51.99  -1843.49  -0.68  6.03
Government  welfare change, without bedging  0.51  -36.12  36.20  1572.73  0.71  5.83
Govemnment  welfare change, with hedging  1.59  -31.64  36.19  413.54  1.95  9.64
Standard efficiency loss  -0.10  -20.95  19.13  -4956.52  40.17  4.62
Producer  income without stabilization program  199.61  123.48  301.04  14.15  0.39  0.53
Producer  income with stabilization progrm  198.71  140.66  258.46  10.02  0.23  0.19
Sample  5
Consumer welfate change  -0.17  -38.99  29.78  -4211.82  -0.42  5.79
Producer  welfare change, exclusive of risk benefit  -0.28  .44.98  46.91  -3524.04  -0.29  5.30
Governent  welfare change, without hedging  0.28  -33A7  36.00  2537.20  0.37  5.51
Government  welfare change, with hedging  1.29  -23.22  3593  442.00  1.98  9.35
Stardard efficiency loss  -0.17  -25.55  19.17  -2743.89  -0.53  S.88
Producer income without stabilization pmgram  202.73  117.39  287.29  14.19  020  -0.04
Producer incone  with stabilization program  202.31  149.88  273.41  10.98  0.29  .0.17
Sample 6
Consumer welfare change  *0.02  -37.21  41.51  -40792.50  -0.11  5.04
Producer  welfare change, exclusive of tisk benefit  -0.63  -68.61  50.41  .1822.79  -0.59  6.63
Government  welfare change, without hedging  0.54  -38.72  47.14  1541.62  0.66  6.72
Government welfare change, with hedging  1.70  -31.82  47.07  408.37  1.81  10.70
Standard efficiency loss  -0.11  -23.21  23.39  -4615.30  -0.25  4.55
Producer incote  witout  stabilization  program  198.42  130.46  323.86  14.74  049  0.61
Producer income with stabilization program  197.48  145.97  261.54  10.35  0.09  .0.48
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Table 12: Deterministic  model simulation  - Producer income and changes in producer,  consumer,  and
government welfare (continued.)
Sbmple  Mean  Minim  Maximum  % CV  Skewnres  KmtasSIS
Sample 7
Conumer  welfae  change  0.02  41.07  28.12  40471.75  -0.21  5.33
Producer weclre  change, exdusive of risk benefit  -0.47  *43.07  52.96  -2021.50  .0.33  5.16
Government welfae  change, without hedging  0."Q  -39.99  33.18  1458.63  0.61  6.31
Government welfae  change, with hedging  1.4d  -30.70  33.16  393.11  1.97  9.33
Stendard efficiency los  0.03  -28.09  18.24  14825.80  -0.19  6.12
Producer income without dablization  program  197.38  130.35  312.77  14.58  0.67  0.87
Producer inxme  with stabilizaton prgram  196.67  136.96  287.16  11.30  0.65  0.99
Sanple  8
Consumer welfhe  change  0.00  -29.61  35.73  9999.00  0.20  4.38
Ptoducet welfa  change, exdusive of risk benefit  40.47  -55.55  34.26  -2117.39  -0.86  5.01
Qi,vermrent welfare change, wihout  hedging  0.52  -26.60  42.17  1395.23  0.88  4.63
Govemnment  welfare change, with hedging  1.62  -13.55  42.17  361.62  2.47  9.03
Standard effilcency loss  0.05  -20.01  22.34  8999.1  -0.02  3.62
Producer bncome without sabiliation  progrm  201.64  124.00  302.86  14.63  0.43  0.12
Producer income with sabilization prgram  200.93  142.43  281.83  11.17  OA7  0.38
Sanmb 9
Consumer welfare change  -0.14  -41.46  42.78  -6220.02  -0.21  4.45
Producer welfare change, exdusive of risk benefit  -0.39  -69.52  46.88  -3104.76  -0.48  4.99
Govenument welfare change, without hedging  0.42  -35.89  50.08  2133.22  0.61  5.70
Govertnent  welfare change, with hedging  1.61  -24.47  50.08  448.77  2.13  10.01
Standard efficiency los  -0.11  -26.66  23.34  -4960.49  -0.40  4.70
Producer ticome without stabiliation  program  201.03  119.81  316.78  15.38  0.51  0.48
Produer  r&me  with stabilization pgram  200.45  148.92  273.96  11.26  0.46  0.04
Sample 10
Conumr  welfare change  -0.03  -33.15  32.84  -27005.83  -0.02  5.02
Producer welfae  change, exdcusve of risk benefit  -0.53  -57.24  37.99  -1906.42  -0.76  5.95
Government vvelfare  change, without hedging  0.44  25,96  34.07  1648.53  0.70  5.17
Government welfare change, with hedging  1.47  -19.39  34.06  393.00  2.29  9.12
Standard efficiency lose  -0.12  -21.27  17.92  -3743.15  -0.33  4.56
Producer income without dabilzation  program  198.53  126.84  290.78  13.73  0.37  0.45
Prducer  inconk with dabilization program  197.74  140.39  267.19  10.02  0.19  0.22
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